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Power, Convenience, and the Elimination
of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courtst
ROBERT HASKELL ABRAMS*
Is it not time that we stop thinking that, because for administrative
purposes it is convenient to divide the United States into judicial
districts, a federal court "sits within and for that district; and is
bounded by its local limits," as the Supreme Court once put it? It
also sits within and for the United States .... "**
Had Congress in the exercise of its article III powers to establish "in-
ferior courts"' chosen to establish only one such tribunal, there would
be little doubt of the constitutional permissibility of such a choice.2 That
court would have been able to hear and decide all cases which Congress
instructed it to adjudicate, subject only to limitation by the scope of the
judicial power.' Assuming efforts were made to inform defendants of the
t Copyright 1983 by Robert Haskell Abrams. All rights reserved.
* A.B. 1969, University of Michigan; J.D. 1973, University of Michigan; Professor of
Law, Wayne State University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan (1983).
The author wishes to thank Professor Edward Cooper for his helpful and encouraging
comments in the early stages of this project and also Bob McAllister for his substantial
research assistance.
** Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lauyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 22 n.87 (1945) (citation omitted).
' "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONST. art. III, 5 1.
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's. THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 309-74 (2d ed. 1973) (hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER).
I
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens
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pendency of litigation sufficient to give them reasonable notice and op-
portunity to be heard4 , binding in personam judgments could be entered
against those defendants without constitutional infirmity. Stated
differently, in this hypothetically simplified system of federal courts the
only relevant constitutional restraints arise from article III and narrow
fifth amendment due process interests. Concern, constitutional or other-
wise, with venue or personal jurisdiction would be wholly inapposite. Not
only is venue not a constitutional consideration,5 in the single-court
hypothetical there is no choice between alternate courthouses of the same
tribunal. The tribunal, as the sole general trial court of the national
sovereign, would also possess personal jurisdiction in the traditional, Pen-
noyer v. Neff ' sense of having sufficient sovereign authority over the
defendant to constitutionally command obedience to the court's judgment.
The hypothetical one-court federal judiciary demonstrates the minimal
inquiry needed to conclude that a constitutionally valid binding judgment
may be rendered by a federal court against a defendant who does not
consent to that court's exercise of jurisdiction over his person. Present
practice in the federal courts is complicated by statutorily and judicially
imposed issues regarding the appropriate place of trial" and methods of
serving process.' Even so, this added complexity does not necessarily make
the constitutional role of personal jurisdiction any more useful in the ex-
isting system of federal courts than in the hypothetical one-court system.
After briefly cataloging the types of federal court cases that raise
difficult conceptual issues regarding personal jurisdiction, this article win
explore in detail the possible function and content of a uniquely federal
concept of personal jurisdiction. After rejecting functions based on con-
stitutional concern for litigant convenience' and federalism of the E-ie
of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2, cL 1-2.
' Such notice is necessary to meet the fifth amendment's procedural due process re-
quirements. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974, Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
' In contrast to personal jurisdiction, venue is widely acknowledged to be wholly
statutory. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 170 (3d ed. 1976).
6 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
' See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1391 (1976) (venue); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (forum non conveniens).
'See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 2361 (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
'See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). See also infra text accompanying notes 94-134.
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vein, 0 other roles for the concept will be considered. This exploration
will be expanded to consider the functions presently served by limita-
tions on service of process and federal venue and the ability of those doc-
trines to subsume all useful aspects of the personal jurisdiction inquiry.
A substantial departure from existing doctrine will be advocated including
a uniquely federal concept of personal jurisdiction predicated on the
"presence" of defendant within the United States, abandonment of most
limits on service of process and original venue, and a heavy reliance on
transfer of venue to protect litigant convenience and judicial efficiency.
The gravest concerns regarding those changes will be seen to involve
forum shopping for favorable choice of law. The ultimate genesis of these
concerns resides in the structure of the American federal system, it is
not attributable to the advocated changes in methodology of asserting
the federal judicial power. Nevertheless, in the later stages of the article,
an argument will be made in favor of a federal choice of law rule as the
best means of minimizing the potential evils of forum shopping that arise
under the advocated system. Taken together, these several changes pro-
vide a more effective basis for operating a unified system of federal courts
in the present highly complex federal system.
I. SITUATIONS CALLING FOR AN ARTICULATED CONCEPT
OF FEDERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Perhaps unfairly the one-court hypothetical wholly belittles the
usefulness of personal jurisdiction as a limit on federal court adjudica-
tions. There are interests currently served by personal jurisdiction, so
that scrutiny of these interests and of other means of insuring their vin-
dication is necessary prior to abandoning all inquiry into federal personal
jurisdiction. As background to the major inquiry a brief discussion of ter-
minology will minimize the hazards of unconsciously merging concerns
appropriate to the state courts with those appropriate to federal courts;
this also serves to clarify the terms used throughout this article.
Thereafter, a series of examples will be advanced which demonstrate the
existence of recurrent issues related to personal jurisdiction and the need
for a total reevaluation of that concept in the federal courts.
A. Terminological Pitfalls: DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc.11
A discussion of cases posing serious questions of personal jurisdiction
requires distinguishing that concept from service of process and from long-
'0 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See infra text accompanying notes 153-205.
654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981).
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arm jurisdiction. As described in this article and elsewhere, 12 personal
jurisdiction is primarily a concept of power, addressing the power of the
particular judicial tribunal to bind a defendant to its judgment. Service
of process refers to the formal procedure by which a defendant is notified
of the pendency of litigation. The sharp distinction between concepts is
blurred by three factors. First, the writ of summons, served together
with the complaint, threatens the defendant with entry of an in personam
judgment should the defendant fail to appear.'" Thus, service of process
acts as a formal assertion of a claimed power of personal jurisdiction.
Second, early statutes governing process authorized only intraterritorial,
in-hand service." As a result, good service evidenced a set of factual con-
ditions: (1) apprehension of defendant (2) by an officer of the sovereign
(3) within the sovereign's territory (4) joined with an order to appear in
court." These facts in turn form the predicate for the valid assertion of
in personam jurisdiction. Only with the advent of extraterritorial service
does the linkage between service of process and personal jurisdiction
dissolve. Third, defendants are sometimes referred to as being "not
amenable to service of process." This creates ambiguity because the phrase
can either refer to technical grounds for immunity from service 6 or serve
as a shorthand expression of the conclusion that the court issuing the
process lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant under the cir-
cumstances. While these factors blur the issue, service and personal
jurisdiction remain independent.
Long-arm statutes stand at the intersection of personal jurisdiction and
service of process. Most frequently these statutes describe the cir-
cumstances under which a state will allow assertion of its courts' authority
over persons and other entities not present within the state. Invocation
of these statutes is an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. To facilitate invocation of the asserted personal jurisdiction, states
frequently include special provisions for extraterritorial service of process
as* part of the long-arm statute. While this practice is common,' it is not
universal. 8 The marriage of assertions of power with the methods for
12 Viewing personal jurisdiction as a concept of power is the traditional norm. See Hazard,
A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 241.
13 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4; id. at form 1.
" See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, S 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
" See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S; 714 (1877); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE S 1064 (1969).
16 For example, California law provides that one who goes to California in response to
a subpoena requiring his testimony at trial may not be served with civil or criminal process
"in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this State under the sub-
poena." CAL. PENAL CODE S 1334.4 (West 1982).
17 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 52-57a (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
S 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, SS 3(d), 4, 6 (Michie/Law. Co-
op. 1974).
" See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE SS 410.10, 415.40 (West 1973); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW
§ 302, 313 (McKinney 1972); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. SS 5322, 5323 (Purdon 1981).
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service of process, however, possesses an obvious potential for com-
mingling two distinct inquiries. Imprecise description of the dual issues
involved with state long-arm statutes not only obscures decisional criteria
in state court cases, it also complicates the present inquiry into a purely
federal concept of personal jurisdiction. Federal courts are specifically
empowered by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) to borrow state law
provisions for extraterritorial service of process. 9 If issues of personal
jurisdiction are erroneously intertwined with those relating to borrowed
service of process methodology, standards for personal jurisdiction in the
federal courts will be wedded to those of their state court counterparts.
Such a practice is simply misguided since federal and state courts should
not be governed by equivalent limitations on the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.0
A recent Third Circuit decision exemplifies the miasma which can arise
from mixing assertions of power over defendants with methods prescribed
for extraterritorial service of process. In DeJames v. Magnifwence Carriers,
Inc. 21 plaintiff, a longshoreman, sought to sue a Japanese shipbuilding firm
for injuries allegedly received as a result of that firm's defective installa-
tion of equipment which refitted a general cargo ship for the transport
of automobiles. Federal suit was commenced in New Jersey where the
injury occurred, with subject matter jurisdiction predicated upon the ex-
clusive grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts." Service of
process was made on the Japanese firm in Japan in a manner consistent
with the multilateral convention on service abroad.' Defendant successful-
ly moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction" and an appeal was
taken. In affirming, the Third Circuit observed that the district court
had premised dismissal on the conclusion that defendant lacked sufficient
'9
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court
is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order
in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state,
or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear and respond or defend in
an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of
his property located within the state, service may in either case be made under
the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e).
' See infra notes 155-65 and text accompanying notes 114-34. But cf Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (where local law establishes a right but expressly bars a
remedy in state courts under certain circumstances, recovery is likewise barred under
the same circumstances in a federal court sitting in diversity); Angel v. Bullington, 330
U.S. 183, 191 (1947) ("If North Carolina has authoritatively announced that deficiency
judgments cannot be secured within its borders, it contradicts the presuppositions of
diversity jurisdiction for a federal court in that state to give such a deficiency judgement.").
21 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 282 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976)).
Id- at 283 (citing Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents,
Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638).
2 DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276, 1284 (D.N.J. 1980).
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contact with the forum state to sustain personal jurisdiction. Recogniz-
ing that contacts with the state might not be the appropriate measure
of federal personal jurisdiction, the opinion explored the rationale for look-
ing at state-specific contacts in an exclusively federal cause of action. The
court then stated, "even in non-diversity cases, if service of process must
be made pursuant to a state long-arm statute or rule of court, the defen-
dant's amenability to suit in federal district court is limited by that statute
or rule."" This statement is at best trivial and at worst unduly restric-
tive of federal judicial power. In either event, its shortcomings are directly
attributable to mixing an inquiry into borrowed service of process statutes
with borrowed personal jurisdiction norms.
To construe the above quoted language as merely trivial it should be
read as saying that service pursuant to borrowed methods for service
of process can be successful only if service complies with the terms of
the borrowed state provision. That is a truism. The DeJames decision
could rest on this ground if it were found that New Jersey does not pro-
vide for service in a foreign nation. The provisions for extraterritorial
service of process are found primarily in the New Jersey Court Rules."
Although not expressly authorizing international service, the New Jersey
Court Rules allow, without geographical limitation, service by certified
or registered mail when the defendant is not present in New Jersey.'
Thus, it is difficult to view the opinion as simply holding that there is
no provision of New Jersey law allowing extraterritorial service in Japan.
Further, if that was the intended objection to adjudication in New Jersey
federal court, the proper motion would have attacked service, not personal
jurisdiction.28
It is more likely that the majority meant to limit federal litigation of
federal causes of action in which service must be obtained by use of bor-
rowed state provisions to constitutional standards of due process and
minimum contacts' applicable to the states. The dissent strongly attacks
this position,"1 as does the remainder of this article. The approach
intertwines extraterritorial service, the means of asserting power over
the foreign defendant, with personal jurisdiction, the limitation on con-
stitutionally permissible exercises of sovereign power. The majority
apparently reasons that Congress, in approving the Federal Rules of Civil
DeJames, 654 F.2d at 283.N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4.
N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(e), 4:4-5(b).
28 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12(bX4) with FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5); see also 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 15, S§ 1351, 1353.
' See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
' See supra text accompanying note 25. The majority then defined its inquiry into the
efficacy of state law authorized service of process as turning on the "argument that Hitachi's
contacts with the state of New Jersey alone were sufficient to support personal jurisdic-
tion under that state's long-arm rule." DeJames, 654 F.2d at 284.
31 DeJames, 654 F.2d at 292-93 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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Procedure as to borrowing of state methods of service process," also in-
timated that federal courts employing state service methodology must
also employ state standards of personal jurisdiction.' Without regard to
its rectitude as an interpretation of existing law, the result is surely an
odd one. A federal court adjudicating a federal admiralty claim is sub-
jected to restrictions on its power identical to those of the fourteenth
amendment that are imposed on state courts. The results obtained by
the majority's convoluted measurement of federal personal jurisdiction
may be defensible,' but one criticism is evident: mixing the concept of
service of process with that of personal jurisdiction occludes the possibility
of a reasoned analysis-that is, one which is predicated upon the separable
policies that underlie limitations on service of process and personal
jurisdiction.
B. Nationwide Service of Process Conjoined with Broad
Choice of Venue: Stafford v. Briggs35
A second genre of recent cases further illustrates the need for devising
a coherent theory of federal personal jurisdiction. Through legislation and
the adoption of rules of procedure, the ability of the federal courts to
summon defendants from great distances has been increased 6 Concomi-
tant with these extensions of service have been revisions, including some
expansion, of the statutes controlling venue.' Little, if any, congressional
attention has been given to personal jurisdiction. Cases involving disputes
over the invocation of liberalized service and venue statutes have begun
to arise and are posing difficult issues for the district courts owing to
the lack of carefully derived principles governing the exercise of federal
personal jurisdiction.
In Stafford v. Briggs, as well as in its companion case, Colby v. Driver,"
SCf. 28 U.S.C. S 2072 (1976) (court rules proscribed by Supreme Court do not take
effect until ninety days after their transmission to Congress).
I DeJanes, 654 F.2d at 286 n.6. Specifically the majority accepts wholly federal service
as an assertion of personal jurisdiction and assumes arguendo that fifth amendment due
process requirements are sufficiently different from those of the fourteenth amendment
to allow aggregation of a defendant's contacts with the United States to serve as a basis
for asserting personal jurisdiction.
The language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) allows federal service to be made
"under the circumstances and in the manner" of local state law. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (emphasis
added). A reading in support of the DeJames result is that "manner" prescribes methodology
and "circumstances" would not allow service if minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy the
fourteenth amendment were lacking.
I The line of defense would stress delimitation of effective limits on federal service
of process as indicative of congressional intent to impose an indentical limitation on assertions
of the judicial power.
444 U.S. 527 (1980).
5, See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 2361 (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
5, See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. SS 1391, 1397 (1976).
34 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
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the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider issues of venue and
personal jurisdiction in federal court suits against federal officials brought
under the Mandamus and Venue Act.39 The statute allows suits against
federal officials acting under the color of office to be brought in a district
where "(1) a defendant . . . resides . . . or, . . . (4) the plaintiff resides
. .. " and provides for nationwide service of process.4" Defendants were
alleged to have acted both in their official and their individual capacities
in violating claimed constitutional rights of the respective plaintiffs.
Consistent with the delineation of service, venue and personal jurisdic-
tion briefly outlined above, defendants ultimately conceded the validity
of the statutorily prescribed nationwide service by mail4 and attacked
only venue and personal jurisdiction. The former was attacked on the
narrow ground that Congress did not intend the particular venue provi-
sion in question to apply in suits alleging claims against defendants ac-
ting in their personal capacities.42 Personal jurisdiction was challenged
as violative of due process in subjecting defendants to potential in per-
sonam judgments in a district for which the minimum contacts test of
International Shoe v. Washington"3 could not be satisfied.44
The Court's majority accepted the statutory construction argument and
held that venue did not lie as to suits in individual capacity.45 The
dissenters read the statute literally and thus reached the personal jurisdic-
tion issue as well. Speaking for himself and Justice Brennan, Justice
Stewart curtly dismissed the due process attack:
The short answer to this argument is that due process requires only
certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the sovereign
that created the court .... The issue is not whether it is unfair to
require a defendant to assume the burden of litigating in an inconven-
ient forum, but rather whether the court of the particular sovereign
has power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a named defendant.
The cases before us involve suits against residents of the United States
in the courts of the United States. No due process problem exists."6
The thesis of this article is in full accord with Justice Stewart's position,
but the propriety of the conclusion is not as self-evident as the quoted
passage would make it appear. Further, the incidence of the problem is
not limited to the single context of situs against federal officials. There
39 28 U.S.C. 5 1391(e) (1976).
40 Id.
" Original attacks in both Stafford v. Briggs and Colby v. Driver included insufficiency
of process. Stafford, 444 U.S. at 531, 533.
42 Chief Justice Burger stated that certiorari was granted "to decide whether the venue
provisions ... apply to actions for money damages brought against federal officials in their
individual capacities." Id. at 529-30.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
" Stafford, 444 U.S. at 531-33.
,1 Id. at 545.
,1 Id. at 554 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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are numerous provisions in the Judicial Code47 and elsewhere,4" as well
as state statutes made relevant in the federal courts by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(e),4 9 that provide for nationwide service of process.
Similarly, there are several venue provisions which do not insure that
the situs of litigation will be in a federal district with which the defen-
dant has substantial contact, purposeful or otherwise.50 As in Stafford v.
Briggs, when these provisions are used to claim power over a defendant
with minimal contact with the forum district, the assertion of federal per-
sonal jurisdiction is not self-evidently correct." The potential for
mischievous use of these and similar statutes remains unabated in the
absence of a clear set of concepts governing federal judicial power. The
Supreme Court, however, has shown little inclination to come to grips
with the underlying personal jurisdiction quandary.
C. State Created Causes of Action in the Federal Courts:
From Bankruptcy to Arrowsmith52
Even if Justice Stewart's conclusion is correct in the context of federal
court litigation of federal causes of action, the gamut of personal jurisdic-
tion issues arising in the federal courts is not exhausted by that paradigm.
As state substantive law becomes more important in the litigation, a
greater number of problematic cases can be put forth. These cases lessen
the allure of adopting a federal standard without first having considered
the arguments militating for application of the personal jurisdiction
"T See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 1655, 1659, 2361 (1976).
" See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 22, 25 (1976).
" The relevant part of this rule is quoted supra note 19. An example of state law authoriz-
ing such service is CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.40 (West 1973).
' 28 U.S.C. § 1397 presents obvious opportunities for locating litigation in a district
where a defendant has no substantial contact. For example, if claimants are geographically
dispersed, selection of one claimant's district is proper yet potentially inconvenient to other
claimants. See also the discussion of bankruptcy litigation infra text accompanying notes 57-64.
" In the securities area, for example, cases such as Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating
Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 197 (ED. Pa. 1974), arise based both on nationwide service of process
and liberal venue provisions allowing suit in any district "wherein any act or transaction
constituting the violation (of the securities laws) occurred." In Oxford, the court erroneously
cited statutory language appropriate to venue in criminal cases, but the civil provision
is equally comprehensive. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). In Leroy v. Great Western United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979), the Supreme Court adopted a somewhat crabbed construction
of the above quoted securities-specific venue provision to avoid confrontation with the
jurisdictional issue. Given the nationwide aspects of securities transactions, the potential
for far-flung litigation is large, and the need for a clear and united federal doctrine is great.
The obvious concern arises from the possibility that defense in a distant or inconvenient
forum would infringe a due process interest of the defendant. See infra text accompanying
notes 94-134; see also Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Territorial Reach of
Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520 (1963}; Note, Removing the Cloak ofPersonal Jurisdiction
From Choice of Law Analysis: Pendent Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 51
FORDHAtM L. REV. 127, 128 n.6 (1982).
1 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
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standard of the state in which the district court sits. The spectrum of
cases includes those in which federal interest such as uniformity and effi-
cient administration' of bankruptcy law are vindicated by reliance on
federal adjudication of state law causes of action and those state law claims
heard in the federal courts solely because of diversity jurisdiction.' It
should be clear that the policy arguments favoring a wholly federal stand-
ard of personal jurisdiction appear weakest in the latter case when only
state substantive interests provide the occasion for invocation of the
federal judicial power.5
While Stafford and analogous cases 6 involve wholly federal causes of
action and application of federal law, the same cannot be said of the federal
litigation spawned by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.2 One such case
is In re Trim-Lean Meat Products, Inc.8 There service was effected pur-
suant to Bankruptcy Rule 704(f)(1) which states that all process except
subpoenas "may be served anywhere within the United States."'59 Venue
is proper in the district court sitting in the state of the bankrupt's incor-
poration without regard to the quantum of operations carried on in that
state." The trustee in Trim-Lean, marshalling the assets of the bankrupt,
sued the bankrupt's debtor in a federal district with which the debtor
had very few contacts.' The underlying cause of action against the
bankrupt's debtor was nonfederal in nature 2 Although the judge in Trim-
Lean described the defendant's contacts with the forum as sufficient to
satisfy International Shoe's minimum contacts standard of due process,6
the opinion indicated an obvious willingness to devise federal standards
for adjudicating the issue of personal jurisdiction.64
U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 4.
- 28 U.S.C. S 1332 (1976). See also Note, supra note 51 (state law claims pendent to federal
claims).
I Some of the articulated benefits of federal diversity jurisdiction include mitigation
of local bias and the infusion of the ideas of federal judges into the process of state law
adjudication. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 9-13 (1973).
There is nothing in these (or other) justifications of diversity jurisdiction that requires
the federal court to have its own standard for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In
comparison, substantive federal policies inherent in the existence of federal causes of action
and the enforceability of the rights they create are affected by the scope of personal jurisdic-
tion of the federal court system.
" See supra note 51.
5 11 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981).
11 Bankr. 1010 (Bankr. D. Del. 1981).
RULES BANKR. PROc. 704(f)(1).
'0 See 28 U.S.C. S 1472 (Supp. 1981); see also 28 U.S.C. S 1473 (Supp. 1981).
81 Trim-Lean, 11 Bankr. at 1011.
" The trustee sought to recover finished goods and cash turned over to the creditor,
alleging that these transfers constituted conversion of property or wrongful delivery of
property. Id. at 1013.
63 Id.
" In the court's view, "[a] resident citizen of the United States has sufficient contacts
with the United States to support the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction over him
by a United States court." Id. (quoting Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir.
1979)).
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Trim-Lean demonstrates that current bankruptcy law creates the fre-
quent possibility of federal and state courts sitting in the same locale
exercising variant standards of personal jurisdiction with respect to
prosecution of a state law claim against the same out-of-state defendant.
Suit brought in state court by the bankrupt-to-be would fail under Inter-
national Shoe; suit by the trustee in federal court would be allowed to
go forward in consequence of the implied congressional intent to employ
a federal rule of personal jurisdiction. In the event of a bankrupt firm
with multistate operations, it would not be surprising to find a number
of the bankrupt's debtors, who dealt with the bankrupt from afar, so
situated. Adoption of a federal standard of personal jurisdiction for state
law claims adjudicated in federal bankruptcy cases stands in contrast to
the Second Circuit's famous en banc decision in the Ar'rowsmith case. 5
Judge Friendly, writing the Arrowsmith majority opinion, held that a
federal court sitting in diversity must limit its assertion of personal
jurisdiction to that of the courts of the state in which it sits." The prin-
ciples regarding the proper accommodation of federal and state interests
announced in Arrowsmith have survived unreviewed by the Supreme
Court,6 7 and are generally accepted by the judiciary68 and commentators 9
alike.
The contrast between use of a federal standard in bankruptcy cases
and use of state standards in diversity cases is explained as a consequence
of the express congressional power to provide uniform laws of bankruptcy
and of the lack of a parallel power regarding diversity litigation. While
Congress found it expedient to provide a means to concentrate all litiga-
tion related to a single bankrupt's estate in a single locale, Congress did
not attempt to provide an entire body of substantive law governing the
bankrupt's dealings; state law applies in many situations. The constitu-
tional demands of diversity jurisdiction are equally satisfied by a similar
arrangement, state law as to substance and, if Congress so chooses, federal
law to govern everything else." As discussed at length later, even Judge
Friendly admits that the Arrowsmith decision is one of policy preference,
not constitutional compulson.7 In view of the emergence of classes of
Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 231.
6, The Supreme Court did not review the Arrowsmith case, see C. WRIGHT, supra note
5, at 304.
11 An extensive list of cases adopting the Arrowsmith view, encompassing all of the
federal circuits, is compiled in Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1103, 1110 nn.1-9 & 20.
11 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 304; Note, Personal Jurisdiction OverForeign Cor-
porations in Diversity Actions: A Tiltyard for the Knights of Erie, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 752,
778 (1964).
70 Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965) (Supreme Court deeming all things
arguably procedural to be within federal competence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2072). But
see infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text (questioning the precise holding in Erie). See
generally Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693 (1974).
71 Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 226.
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federal cases applying state substantive law yet using federal standards
of personal jurisdiction, it is not too ambitious to suggest that Arrowsmith
ought to be reexamined to determine whether its policy choice remains
correct, and if so, whether those policies are better served by a different
method than borrowing state standards of personal jurisdiction. This
undertaking is especially appropriate after having found that in other
contexts the borrowing of state standards of personal jurisdiction is ill-
conceived. Similarly, Justice Stewart's statement that "due process re-
quires only certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the
sovereign that created the court"72 must also be reevaluated.73
II. DUE PROCESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FAIRNESS: THE
RELATIONSHIP OF PENNOYER TO INTERNATIONAL SHOE
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have apparently
departed from the traditional logic of Pennoyer v. Neff 4 in assessing the
constitutional validity of state court assertions of personal jurisdiction.
Whereas Pennoyer stressed the state's sovereign power in determining
whether a state could validly bind a defendant to a judgment, and linked
power to presence within the territorial limits of the state,75 modern cases
adopt a different vernacular. Starting with International Shoe Co. v. State
of Washington," and culminating in a series of four decisions in the space
of three years,77 a spoken concern for fair treatment of the defendant78
has been a major emphasis of constitutional limitation of state court power.
These cases, in the name of due process, erect a constitutional require-
ment that no unconsenting defendant may be bound if to do so would
violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."" It is
Stafford, 444 U.S. at 554.
' See supra text accompanying note 46. But see Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2108-12 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). Powell's
view, like Friendly's, admits the possibility of congressional action to establish purely federal
rules of personal jurisdiction, but insists that the present dependence of federal diversity
jurisdiction on state law doctrines imports limits on sovereignty as well.
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Id. at 722.
76 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977).
"' E.g., in Kulko the Court stated, "[An essential criterion in all cases is whether the
'quality and nature'-of the defendant's activity is such that it is 'reasonable' and 'fair' to
require him to conduct his defense in that State." 436 U.S. at 92. The pretense that an
assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over
the owner of the property was viewed in Shaffer as a fiction containing consequences "fun-
damentally unfair to the defendant." 433 U.S. at 212.
"' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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crucial to discover in what ways this due process requirement departs
from the concept of territorial power developed in Pennoyer.
Several relationships between Pennoyer and International Shoe are
logically possible, but the two most important are: first, that the due
process inquiries of Pennoyer and International Shoe are intimately related,
and International Shoe simply defines "presence" for the purpose of
deciding whether conditions for a constitutionally valid exercise of jurisdic-
tion are met; or, second, that satisfaction of International Shoe requires
an independent inquiry into fair treatment of the defendant as a necessary
condition for the constitutionally valid exercise of jurisidiction. The first
relationship is important because if it obtains, it would render the vast
majority of federal assertions of personal jurisdiction constitutional
without question.' Any defendant found within the United States would
almost invariably satisfy the International Shoe test of presence through
contact with the United States and would thereby be subject to the con-
stitutional reach of the federal judicial power. If, however, the latter rela-
tionship obtains, then it would appear that in order to render constitu-
tionally valid judgments even federal courts must undertake an elaborate
inquiry into convenience and other factors that affect fairness. 1
A. A Preliminary View of International Shoe as the Modern
Incarnation of Pennoyer
There is much in the logic of Chief Justice Stone's majority opinion
in International Shoe which suggests that the genesis of the previously
quoted language regarding "fair play and substantial justice" is an at-
tempt to modernize Pennoyer and apply it to foreign corporations doing
business within the forum state. As such, International Shoe becomes an
exercise in the application of Pennoyer's concept of power rather than
the fount of a new and independent constitutional restraint on the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction.
In the era preceding International Shoe, corporations, although lacking
a corporeal presence akin to that of individuals, had nevertheless been
found amenable to assertions of personal jurisdiction by the courts of
states in which such corporations conducted business.' While the resultant
ability to sue corporations in states other than their state of incorporation
3
was unobjectionable,' the basis for the assertion of such authority re-
mained rather muddled.85 Sometimes the requisite authority was deemed
" See infra text accompanying notes 82-90.
81 See Abraham, supra note 51; Seeburger, The Federal Long-Arm: The Uses ofDiversity,
or "Tain't So, McGee, 10 IND. L. REv. 480 (1977).
2 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 1066.
3Id.
u Id.
' Id. at 224.
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to be a function of implied consent to jurisdiction.' Less fictive theories
also appeared, the most prominent of which was a theory of corporate
presence. This theory looked at a defendant corporation's activities and
subjected the corporation to suit "if it [was] doing business within the
State in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that
it is present there."87 The two distinct lines of reasoning, implied consent
and corporate presence, both relied heavily on the threshold determina-
tion that a corporation was "doing business" within a state, and that term
too took on a life of its own as an independent test of personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresident corporate defendants.88 After tracing these
developments in some detail, Professors Wright and Miller conclude that
International Shoe was the Supreme Court's "attempt to chart a course
across the morass [of personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporations]
by drawing some reasonably definitive guidelines."' This approach to In-
ternational Shoe supports the conclusion that the minimum contacts test,
although phrased with reference to fairness to litigants, is simply an
elucidation of the degree of in-state activity or presence that allows the
exercise of state power under the principles laid down in Pennoyer.1 As
stated by Professor Moore,"The principles of International Shoe are
grounded upon concepts of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective states to subject nonresidents to the jurisdiction of their
courts."'" Thus, the relationship between Pennoyer and International Shoe
is that they are highly similar tests of the sovereign's authority to bind
a nonconsenting defendant to the judgment of its courts. In turn, it would
seem that the federal courts, as representative of a nationwide sovereign
could, consistent with the Constitution, exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant without regard to convenience if the defendant is present
within the United States.2
B. The Limited Role of Fairness as an Independent Constitutional Value
Within the last twenty years two principal events gave rise to con-
sideration of a generalized kind of fairness to a defendant as part of the
essential content of the due process guarantee in the personal jurisdic-
tion area. First, as noted above, the language appearing in several
See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882).
Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, at 223-34; see Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,
Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, at 223-24.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724-26.
9 2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.25[5] (2d ed. 1982).
9' Cf. id. at 4.25[5] (as to federal question cases; no position is taken regarding diversity
cases).
"' See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court cases lends plausibility to the idea." Second, the broad
federal judicial power urged by the American Law Institute in its 1969
study of the division of jurisdiction between state and federal courts pro-
voked a good deal of scholarly attention to this and kindred topics. 4 For
example, as early as 1963, the first tentative draft of the ALI Study took
the position that there were no substantial constitutional constraints
relevant to federal assertions of in personam jurisdiction." Professor
Abraham wrote in criticism:
There appears to be more than a similarity of verbiage between the
due process clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. There
is no clear reason why the "traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice" embodied in the Fifth Amendment should not also en-
compass some measure of protection against inconvenient litigation,
even though the protection is not identical to that accorded by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 6
Although the content of the doctrinal limit advocated by Abraham is
vague, it merits exploration given the recurring language in Supreme
Court opinions supportive of such an interpretation. This brief survey
will show, however, that there is little independent content to "fair play
and substantial justice," and that this minimal content is consistent with
the thesis that such a limitation is virtually meaningless in the federal
courts.
The case that is most supportive of the creation of an independent
fairness inquiry of constitutional magnitude is Shaffer v. Heitner17 Shaf-
fer involved the constitutionality of Delaware's exercise of quasi in rem
jurisdiction predicated upon sequestration of shares of stock in a Delaware
corporation. Rather than consider the claim that prejudgment sequestra-
tion of the stock deprived the defendant of property without adequate
notice and opportunity to be heard," Justice Marshall's six member
majority" faced head on the conditions under which quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion could be exercised constitutionally.
Much of Marshall's analysis appears to be at odds with the preceeding
section of this article which implicitly relies on the continued validity of
Pennoyer's concept of power as the norm for testing assertions of per-
"' See, e.g., Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1,268 (1968-1969) (parts l and 2); Foster, Long-Arim Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969
Wis. L. REV. 9.
65 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 138 (Tent. Draft No. 1; 1963); see also Abraham, supra note 51, at 522.
" Abraham, supra note 51, at 536.
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
" Id. at 189.
" Justice Marshall's opinion was joined by Justices Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun,
and Powell; Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment; Justice Brennan joined in parts
I-III of Justice Marshall's opinion but dissented from part IV; Justice Rehnquist did not
participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
sonal jurisdiction. In parts II and III of the Shaffer opinion Marshall
explicitly traces and accepts the reasons for regarding International Shoe
and not Pennoyer as the operative standard for measuring all assertions
of state court personal jurisdiction. 0 Careful scrutiny, however,
demonstrates that what Marshall rejects is that aspect of Pennoyer which
mechanically measures sovereign power; he does not reject reliance on
sovereign power as the delimiter of a state's asserted personal jurisdic-
tion. What Marshall draws from International Shoe is not an abstract ideal
of fair treatment of defendants; rather, he adopts its more flexible and
realistic inquiry into when power is justifiably exercised."'
Context is, of course, relevant to interpretation. Shaffer presents the
assertion of power by the State of Delaware solely on the basis of owner-
ship of stock in a Delaware corporation."'2 The claim of power is limited
by the value of the property sequestered. Dicta in Pennoyer, read literally,
would have the court inquire whether the sequestration procedure was
properly invoked, and if so, conclude that the defendant can be forced
to respond or risk entry of judgment for an amount up to the value of
the sequestered property.0 3 This limited inquiry would constitute the full
scope of due process protection without regard to the relationship between
the property seized and the litigation in issue, the defendant's other con-
tacts with the forum state, or the state's connection with the particular
litigants or transaction involved. Indeed, if Pennoyer commands such a
result, it offers scant due process protection to defendants haled into court
on the fortuitous basis of presence of property in the forum state.
Moreover, Delaware's assertion that Delaware is the situs of intangible
property like stock in a Delaware corporation compounds the hazard to
potential defendants."' Pennoyer, however, need not be interpreted so
dogmatically that a defendant's constitutional protections are virtually
eliminated.
10 See infra text accompanying note 113.
"' See, e.g., 2 J. MOORE, supra note 91.
102 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 192. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 169 (1975), makes Delaware the situs
of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, 5 366 (1975), pro-
vides for seizure of defendants' Delaware property in order to compel their appearance
in court.
103
It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the non-resident
situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into that non-resident's
obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be carried only to
the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
104
If its procedure were upheld, Delaware would, in effect, impose a duty of in-
quiry on every purchaser of securities in the national market. For unless the
purchaser ascertains both the state of incorporation of the company whose
shares he is buying, and also the idiosyncracies of its law, he may be assuming
an unknown risk of litigation.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring). For the basis of Delaware's assertion
of jurisdiction, see supra note 102.
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Marshall does not reject Pennoyer's premise that "state authority to
adjudicate was based on the jurisdiction's power over either persons or
property."'0 5 Instead he notes, "[T]his fundamental concept is embodied
in the very vocabulary which we use to describe judgments."'1 In the
19th century, rote application of the test of presence of person or property
performed the function of providing an easy basis on which to sanction
or bar state court assertions of jurisdiction. In personam jurisdiction, for
example, was easily determined on the basis of corporeal presence of the
defendant within the forum state."7 This mechanical means of obtaining
in personam jurisdiction, standing alone, proved inadequate to meet the
needs of the states to provide judicial remedies for legal disputes arising
within their borders. A potential defendant could easily remove himself
from the forum state and thereby avoid its jurisdiction. Marshall, in
accepting this view,0 8 found the growth of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion to be a response to these needs. As a matter of theory, the jurisdic-
tion was explained as an incident of a sovereign's territorial power to
control the disposition of property found within its borders. 9 Marshall
also noted that increased interstate commerce had led to the expansion
of allowable assertions of in personam jurisdiction based on contacts with
the forum. This process, ultimately culminating in the adoption of the
International Shoe standard as an allowable measure of extraterritorial
reach of state in personam jurisdiction,"' sharply reduced the need for
unthinking invocation of power over property as a sufficient basis for
state court jurisdiction. Thus, the conditions were ripe for a reconsidera-
tion of jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property in the forum
state.
Marshall's reading of jurisdictional history clearly indicates that Inter-
national Shoe was first developed as a limit on extensions of Pennoyer's
jurisdictional reach, and not as a limit upon Pennoyer itself. International
Shoe, and cases like it,"' concerned claims of in personam extraterritorial
power not allowable under Pennoyer's rigid territorial formula. Thus,
Shaffer, not International Shoe, is the watershed for convincing claims
that due process fairness inquiries limit or replace the power theories
of Pennoyer. In this respect, Marshall's central attack on Pennoyer is rather
narrow. In personam jurisdiction based on the defendant's presence is
not considered;"2 rather, Marshall attacks that part of Pennoyer's dicta
pertaining to the presence of property in the forum:
"I Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199.
SId.
See, e.g., C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, at 206-07.
100 Shaffer, 433 US. at 210.
10 Id. at 199-200.
0 I& at 203-04. See also supra text accompanying notes 82-90.
m See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927); see generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, at 225-36.
112 Marshall would not take issue with jurisdiction based on actual corporeal presence.
Instead, Marshall objects to highly fictive theories that substitute for actual presence.
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[Alithough the theory that territorial power is both essential to and
sufficient for jurisdiction has been undermined, we have never held
that the presence of property in a State does not automatically confer
jurisdiction over the owner's interest in that property. This history
must be considered as supporting the proposition that jurisdiction
based solely on the presence of property satisfies the demands of due
process .... but it is not decisive. "Traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" can be as readily offended by the perpetuation
of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of
new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our con-
stitutional heritage.... The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction
over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the
owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial
modern justifications. Its continued acceptance would only serve to
allow state court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the
defendant.
We therefore conclude that all assertions of state court jurisdic-
tion must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in Inter-
national Shoe and its progeny."'
The logic of Shaffer retains force even in the case of a defendant actually
present and subject to service in the forum state. There is little intuitive
appeal to a state's claim that it can bind a person to the dictates of its
judicial tribunals solely because that individual was fleetingly present
within the territorial limits of the state."' Read on this level, however,
Shaffer challenges only Pennoyer's mechanistic rule that a defendant's
corporeal presence in itself justifies jurisdiction. What is left unquestioned
is the more general principle that sufficient presence within the forum
state supports the exercise of jurisdiction. International Shoe and its
realistic assessment of "presence" are the operative measure of when
sovereign power attaches. Pennoyer is revised as to how it is to be applied,
but its bedrock conception of territorial power is unimpaired.
Likewise, the applicability of Shaffer's broad language to federal courts
is not self-evident. The concluding sentence of the above quoted excerpt
is penned in limitation of a state's attempt to exercise extraterritorial
authority over a defendant not present in the forum state. Its content,
the International Shoe standard of fairness, was developed in that precise
context. It is not ineluctably true that intraterritorial assertions of per-
sonal jurisdiction are necessarily subject to International Shoe's fairness
scrutiny despite the presence of the word "all" in Marshall's opinion.
Neither International Shoe nor Shaffer was concerned with the case of
a defendant found physically within the forum, and thus their applicability
to that case should be measured by the force their reasoning would
,,3 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211-12.
1 See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). See generally
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
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command in that context, not by the mere presence of dicta that would
reach (perhaps unintentionally) the intraforum defendant.
The above analysis is corroborated by the Supreme Court's application
of due process standards in Shaffer and subsequent cases. The Interna-
tional Shoe standard of fairness has been employed predominantly as a
measuring rod for the substantiality of the defendant's presence within
the forum. It has not served as a springboard for creating new types
of fairness claims sufficient to prevent constitutional assertions of jurisdic-
tion when there is more than fleeting presence in the forum. The
convenience to a defendant of the forum chosen has no importance in con-
stitutional decisionmaking.
Shaffer turns to the application of the International Shoe standard in
part IV of the opinion. A catalog of the opinion would be tedious but the
reasons offered in support of jurisdiction and Marshall's rejection of them
as insufficient can be characterized as being an ad hoc determination that
the defendant's contacts with Delaware were too attenuated to allow
jurisdiction. For example, ownership of stock in a Delaware corporation is
"not ... sufficient to support jurisdiction." ' Likewise, Marshall express-
ly notes, "Heitner did not allege and does not now claim that appellants
have ever set foot in Delaware."'1 6 The most illuminating passages in the
opinion reject the argument that the defendants, officers, and directors
in a Delaware corporation benefitted from their Delaware association and
thus should be amenable to suit in Delaware for their corporate activities.
Marshall states in response that the argument "does not demonstrate
that appellants have 'purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State,'... in a way that would
justify bringing them before a Delaware tribunal.""17 The purport of this
language is unmistakably an analysis of whether the nonresidents have
sufficient contacts to deem them "present" and thus within the scope of
Pennoyer's power as measured by the realistic International Shoe standard.
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the reach of state court personal
jurisdiction since Shaffer are likewise concerned with extraterritorial
claims of power. This warrants repeating because the United States' ter-
ritorial jurisdiction is, of course, not bounded by state lines. Thus, all
of the Supreme Court decisions are relevant only by rough analogy when
the federal courts seek to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant
found outside the forum district but within the United States and having
substantial contacts with the United States."' Nevertheless, like Shaffer's
" Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213.
18 Id.
Id. at 216 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
" The federal courts have, throughout history, been organized into districts which do
not span state lines. Only once did Congress create federal fora that had territorial limits
crossing state lines. See Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, S 21, 2 Stat. 89. This tradition, however,
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broad dicta, subsequent decisions keep alive the possibility of independ-
ent content for the concept of fairness in the exercise of judicial power.
The first post-Shaffer case, Kulko v. Superior Court,"' held California's
claim of personal jurisdiction to enter a child support decree against a
New York parent whose children were living in California with their
mother violative of due process. Justice Marshall, again writing for a six
member majority,"' applied the International Shoe standard and found
insufficient "affiliating circumstances" to satisfy the test.2 ' More
interesting, however, is his comment on the fact that California, in defense
of its assertion of power did not seek to rely on defendant's fleeting
presence in California many years earlier. After noting that Kulko had
passed through the state on his way to and from the Korean War, Marshall
stated: "To hold such temporary visits to a State a basis for the assertion
of in personam jurisdiction over unrelated actions arising in the future
would make a mockery of the limitations on state jurisdiction imposed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.""' The clear import of the passage is that
a defendant's physical presence in the jurisdiction may, in some cases,
fail to sustain the invocation of in personam jurisdiction.
Even more recently, the Court decided a pair of cases involving long-
arm jurisdiction and jurisdiction by attachment of property. In World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 2 ' Justice White refused to allow
Oklahoma to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a retail seller and
East Coast regional distributor of an allegedly defective automobile which
had been driven to Oklahoma and been involved in a collision there.
Although relying on a classic minimum contacts rationale as the basis
for decision, White's opinion talks of due process as protective of dual
interests:
[Mlinimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but
distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the
burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts
should not be taken to belie the power of the federal government to arrange its courts
on a unitary national basis.
119 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
... Justice Marshall's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens; Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion was joined by
Justices White and Powell.
12 Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92.
"2 Id. at 93. The facts of Kulko are not particularly helpful for drawing lines concerning
the quantum of presence in the forum that will suffice. The California presence was 13
years before the litigation commenced, for a mere total of four days and it was wholly
unrelated to the cause of action being litigated. Id. Kulko can thus be viewed as supporting
a broad interpretation of the Shaffer dictum that would have International Shoe be the
sole modern authority to be consulted in determining consonance with due process. Similarly,
there is nothing in Kulko which either supports or negates the possibility that fairness
could be violated, even in a case of less fleeting presence.
1 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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to ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach out beyond
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in
a federal system."
In reading White's opinion it is difficult to be certain whether a defen-
dant, on the basis of claimed inconvenience alone, is constitutionally pro-
tected from a plaintiffs choice of an inconvenient forum. Three factors
account for this uncertainty. First, White specifically notes that the defen-
dant's convenience interest is to be weighed against a number of other
factors "including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,
. . . the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,
... the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States
in furthering substantive social policies .... "' Second, White recognizes
that the guarantee against inconvenience has been "substantially relaxed
over the years""12 due to a "fundamental transformation in the American
economy."' Third, in actually deciding that due process would be violated
if World-Wide could be forced to litigate in Oklahoma, White speaks of
a specialized kind of foreseeability measured in terms of whether a defen-
dant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."' 8 Thus,
it is difficult to ascertain what, if any, concrete constitutional significance
attaches to the inconvenience criterion. Judging from White's own
qualification of the idea as well as his reliance on a test that does not
speak in terms of inconvenience as the basis for decision, inconvenience
can be seen to limit state court assertions of personal jurisdiction in only
the most attenuated way.
Rush v. Savchuk' was decided as a companion case to World-Wide
Volkswagen. Rush, however, involved quasi in rem jurisdiction obtained
by attaching the obligation of the defendant's insurer to defend lawsuits
arising out of the operation of the insured's automobile." Justice Marshall
wrote the majority opinion which reiterated the teaching of Shaffer that
all assertions of jurisdiction are to be measured by the International Shoe
standard. Focusing on the insured's total lack of contact with the forum
save the activities of his insurance company, Marshall easily concluded
that International Shoe was not satisfied.2 ' Only one passage in the opinion
is of note to the present inquiry. In reviewing the basis on which "Seider
124 Id. at 291-92.
12 Id. at 292.
,26 Id. at 293.
12 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
128 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
12 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
12 This method of establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction is authorized in Minnesota by
MINN. STAT. § 571.41, subd. 2 (1978).
"' Rush, 444 U.S. at 329.
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type"'3 jurisdiction had been previously sustained, Marshall stated that
those opinions impermissibly "shift the focus of the inquiry from the rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation to that among
the plaintiff, the forum, the insurer, and the litigation."", The emphasis
on the defendant may be taken to suggest that convenience is relevant,
but it can hardly be construed as an explicit and absolute constitutional
requirement.
Although the foregoing review of the Supreme Court's most recent
treatment of due process attacks on state court jurisdiction has been
somewhat tedious, it establishes that no credible convenience requirement
exists as a matter of constitutional necessity. At most, a defendant's
interest in a convenient forum has received some support as an interest
protected by, and almost wholly subsumed by, the minimum contacts
inquiry. Even in the cases most congenial to the convenience concept,
a constitutional interest in a defendant's convenience has played no part
in the decisional calculus and is discounted to accommodate systemic
interests in administration of an interstate system of courts."
Even more problematic is the claim that this amorphous constitutional
interest restricts the courts of a sovereign that finds a defendant currently
present within its borders. All of the decided cases involve extraterritorial
assertions of power; all involve one of the several states as sovereign,
not the United States; all accept the fundamental aspect of Pennoyer which
conjoins sovereign power and personal jurisdiction. What the cases discuss
and resolve is the standard by which the equivalent of presence is
established so that the sovereign may bind a party to the judgment of
its courts. At the very most, modern due process analysis suggests that
fleeting corporeal presence standing alone without other "affiliating
contacts" may no longer be adequate justification for a finding of in per-
sonam jurisdiction. A defendant's convenience is not the constitutional
foundation of such a limitation on Pennoyer's literal claim of power in
such a case.'35
,3 Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966). The court in Seider held that
the contractual obligation of an insurance company to its insured under a liability insurance
policy is a debt subject to attachment under state law if the insurer does business in the
state and that jurisdiction may be predicated on such attachment. Id. at 114, 216 N.E.2d
at 314.
13 Rush, 444 U.S. at 332.
" See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 124.
135 The conclusion that due process should be measured without reference to defendant's
convenience (either independently or as a strand of fairness, see infra text accompanying
notes 136-50) may strike some readers as surprising or incorrect. A less ambitious position
also justified by the analysis of this article would admit that due process imposes some
concept of convenience but that interest need not be manifested as an abstract rule of
"jurisdiction." Instead, individualized case-by-case decisions regarding transfer or dismissal
better honor the constitutional concern. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 (1981); 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).
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C. Vindication of Fairness Values Without Limiting
Personal Jurisdiction
Apart from the claim that International Shoe has taken on a due process
life of its own, two other assaults on the validity of Pennoyer were urged
by Professor Ehrenzweig in an earlier era. First, that Pennoyer was mere
ipse dixit;136 second, and far more important for present purposes, that
Pennoyer and its concept of territorial power leads courts to ask the wrong
question and obtain the wrong result in the case of transient defendants
fortuitously served while within the forum.' 3 Ehrenzweig's two attacks
on Pennoyer both stem from a concern for the convenience of the defen-
dant; this concern bears further exploration before claiming with full con-
fidence that personal jurisdiction has no constitutional role in assuring
the protection of a defendant's inconvenience.
Ehrenzweig posits the proverbial "hard case" and defies the logic of
Pennoyer to solve it in a jurisprudentially satisfactory manner. He opens
his famous attack on Pennoyer picturing an about-to-be defendant seated
in the lounge of a transcontinental airliner. Once the plane enters the
forum state's airspace, that unfortunate soul is served with process. 138
For many years to come, to his great expense and greater annoyance,
he will have to defend a law suit in a New York court three thousand
miles away from his home, even though the plaintiff may be a spiteful
competitor alleging a fanciful claim dating back many years to a trip
abroad.' 39
Also troubling to Ehrenzweig is the fact that the forum can be one "where
neither plaintiff nor defendant resides and which has no connection with
the cause of action."'40 It is not necessary to disagree that a number of
evils inhere in the hypothetical tagging episode; the only inquiry that
must be undertaken for the moment is ascertaining whether the due
process clause of the Constitution forbids the practice because of inconve-
nience or unfairness to the defendant."'
A first line of response to the problem is to argue that tagging, however
odious in this particular instance, is a legislatively struck balance between
a plaintiff's need to be able to commence an action and a defendant's
interest in being free from inconvenience. Such a response avoids giving
" Ehrenzweig, supra note 114, at 296.
Id. at 289-90.
' Id. at 289. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
"' Ehrenzweig, supra note 114, at 289.
1' Id-
" It is possible to argue persuasively that "tagging" violates due process or other con-
stitutional guarantees because fleeting presence is insufficient to allow the sovereigu's power
to attach. A finding of unconstitutionality on a lack of presence theory, however, is
theoretically distinct from a similar finding predicated on an inconvenience theory.
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a direct answer to whether the interest of inconvenience is constitutionally
relevant by suggesting that even if it is, it stands in equipoise to the
plaintiffs equal and opposite due process interest in being able to invoke
the judicial system to adjudicate a dispute.'42 The legislative choice
preferring plaintiffs may be imperfect, but it is hardly susceptible to
substantive invalidation... in the post-Lochner'" era. Further, to the extent
that the magnitude of the burden on would-be defendants is relevant in
determining whether the Constitution forbids the practice 45 other
ameliorative devices are available.
146
Although this treatment of Ehrenzweig's hypothetical is rather cursory,
the conclusion is sound. While the hypothetical chronicles a substantial
abuse of the coercive power of a judicial system, the proper remedy is
not a denial of jurisdiction on the basis of constitutional theories which
are demonstrably difficult to adjudicate. Ehrenzweig would probably agree
that his objections to jurisdiction are nonconstitutional in origin.4 7 Instead,
he finds their basis in international law precedents.. and in the inexact
analogy between the several states and independent nations.' He views
"42 Cf. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exer-
cise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1383-84 (1952-1953) (suggesting a possible constitu-
tional imperative commanding grant of jurisdiction to vindicate plaintiffs vested rights).
' In the modern era, such legislative choices need only demonstrate a real or substantial
relation to the objective of the law in order to be upheld. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW §,8-7, at 450-51 (1978).
1" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), was the origin of the doctrine that due process
authorized courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believed the legislature had
acted unwisely. This doctrine has been subsequently disavowed by the Court on many
occasions. See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 937-39 (1973).
1 It may not be relevant. Cf Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (Justice Brennan's
majority opinion indicates that a judicially created remedy for violation of a federal con-
stitutional right can be eclipsed if "congress has provided an alternative remedy which
it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the constitution and
viewed as equally effective") (emphasis in the original). Analogously the legislature, by
opting for tagging and providing the amelioratives outlined infra note 146 could arguably
pretermit consideration of burdens on defendant as a constitutionally required inquiry.
148 In the federal courts, Ehrenzweig's unlucky transient could forfend protracted litiga-
tion of a spurious suit through a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or through
a motion for summary judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 56. He could engage in
effective discovery by methods not requiring him to leave his west coast abode, e.g., id.
30(b)(7) (oral deposition by telephone), 31 (deposition upon written questions), 33
(interrogatories), and 36 (request for admission), while simultaneously enjoying protection
against harassment in discovery, see id. 26(c), and possibly obtaining costs and attorney's
fees for some of the work involved, id. 37(a)(4), (b)-(d). A state court may invoke the forum
non conveniens doctrine and dismiss, see generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
631 (2d ed. 1977), while in the federal system a change of venue may be possible, see, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. S 1404 (1976); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (federal
use of forum non conveniens). Finally, it is no longer patent that transcontinental travel
is so inherently burdensome as to be constitutionally proscribed in a situation such as that
befalling Ehrenzweig's unfortunate traveler.
147 Ehrenzweig, supra note 114, at 292-93.
148 Id. at 289 n.3, 302-03.
149 Id. at 308-12.
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the fundamental error of Pennoyer to be the conclusion that mere transient
presence was, in the 19th century, a wholly sufficient condition for the
exercise of jurisdiction over the person. Further, his objection is limited
to the case of transients only temporarily found within the forum. Thus,
even if one grants force to all aspects of his argument, it is a surprisingly
narrow inroad on the modern uses of Pennoyer. The jurisdiction that
Ehrenzweig would deny is precisely that which is most questionable after
the decisions in Shaffer, Kulko, World-Wide and Rush, all of which con-
cern assertions of power where presence is either fictive or de minimus.'51
Thus, as was the case before, the argument does little to establish due
process guarantees against inconvenient litigation. It raises important
policy concerns, but they are lessened by the available panoply of
ameliorative procedural devices which reduce the burden on defendants
in such suits. In all, the best course appears to be that of leaving remedies
for inconvenience on a nonconstitutional plane."'
III. ERTE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CHECK ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION
IN A COMPLEX SYSTEM OF FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
Thus far concern was focused on due process based constraints surround-
ing the assertion of personal jurisdiction. The precedents studied have
been cases involving state courts, but the conclusions have been drawn
with an eye toward how the federal courts should ascertain the constitu-
tional limits of their power to bind unconsenting defendants. The stand-
ard which has emerged is that the federal courts are, in reliance on a
revised view of Pennoyer v. Neffs '52 theory of sovereign power, constitu-
tionally free to claim personal jurisdiction over any defendant found within
the United States.
The standard was developed without reference to Arrowsmith v. United
Press International" which demonstrated the centrality of federalism
concerns to a complete theory of federal personal jurisdiction. Specifically,
the possible applicability of the dictates of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins T1
,13 See generally supra notes 97-133 and accompanying text. The presence in Delaware
of the Shaffer defendants was certainly fictive. As the Court noted, "Heitner did not allege
and does not now claim that appellants have ever set foot in Delaware. Nor does he identify
any act related to his cause of action as having taken place in Delaware." Shaffer, 433
U.S. at 213. The "presence" in Delaware of the stock by which Heitner sought to force
the defendants to appear in court was supported by a statutory fiction. See supra note
102. In Kulko, defendant's presence in the forum state was only marginally greater. See
supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
,"I The issue of tagging and its implications is extensively treated in Posnak, A Uniform
Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory,
30 EMoRY L.J. 729 (1981). A rich and diverse pre-existing literature is cited by Professor
Posnack. Id. at 731 nn.10 & 11.
2 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
1 1 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
114 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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must be considered. There Justice Brandeis suggested that a federal
court's application of state law is constitutionally required with respect
to some issues in diversity cases. If personal jurisdiction is within the
constitutional shadow of Erie, the standard advocated in this article cannot
be applied in diversity cases. Alternatively, if personal jurisdiction is
distinguishable from the constitutional aspect of Erie, the discussion may
provide guidance about the extent to which a nonconstitutional limita-
tion on federal court jurisdiction is advisable.
A. The Constitutional Content of the Erie Decision
The decision in Erie is a bit of an oddity as a benchmark of constitu-
tional adjudication. Justice Brandeis expressly claimed it to be a constitu-
tional decision, yet there is virtually no citation of the applicable con-
stitutional provisions or of any case law deriving those identifying
provisions.'55 Scholars have explicated the analysis omitted by Brandeis,
finding its essence to be the absence of a grant of constitutional authority
to the federal government to provide the rule of decision in a diversity
case. " ' This argument is spawned by the tenth amendment 57 and the lack
of express federal power to displace state regulation of the type involved
in Erie.'58 The grant to Congress of authority to vest diversity jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts'59 is found to be an insufficient constitutional
predicate to support federal regulation of the underlying events that gave
rise to the state law created cause of action. 0 Likewise, neither the abun-
dantly broad commerce clause'' nor the necessary and proper clause1 '
allow federal fixing of the rule of decision in a situation like Erie where
the sole federal connection with the case is its fortuitous presence in
federal court as a result of the citizenship of the parties.
The concept of personal jurisdiction, however, is not readily equated
with the application of a general federal common law to diversity cases.
1" Id. at 78-79, 80.
" See, e.g., Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 702-05 (1974).
" "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
1 In Erie, this involved the rule of decision in a tort case as to whether a person on
a longitudinal path beside a railroad is a trespasser or a licensee. Erie, 304 U.S. at 70.
" "The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies ... between Citizens of different
States ...." U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2, para. 1.
60 "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a state . . . ." Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
16' "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce ... among the several
States . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl: 3.
162 "The Congress shall have Power ... to make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this constitution in the Government of the United States, or any Department or Officer
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8 cl. 18.
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Congress enjoys express article III power to create federal courts and
vest subject matter jurisdiction for deciding diversity cases.", If the power
to authorize application of federal standards of personal jurisdiction is
not an inherent element of this express power, it is surely an incident
of the necessary and proper powers granted to effectuate express
powers."' Even decisions like Ar'rowsmith, which adopt a state standard
of personal jurisdiction in federal diversity actions, readily concede that
the reason for using a state standard is nonconstitutional. Judge Friend-
ly's language stating this position is clear: "[W]e fully concede that the
constitutional doctrine announced in [Erie] would not prevent the Congress
or its rule-making delegate from authorizing a district court to assume
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in an ordinary diversity case
although the state court would not." '165 Thus, constitutionally, the federal
courts may apply a federal personal jurisdiction standard in diversity
cases.
B. Federalism and Choice of Law
Erie's constitutional theory is not, however, its sole contribution to in-
struction regarding the proper role of the federal courts in a judicial
system that includes parallel state and federal enforcement of state
created causes of action. The far more accessible portion of Brandeis'
opinion described the evils of shopping for the forum providing the most
favorable substantive law governing the dispute. In his criticism of Swift
v. Tyson's'l6 acceptance of general federal common law, Brandeis recalled
the infamous Taxicab case'" in which an anticompetitive contract was made
enforceable by altering the place of the plaintiffs incorporation to achieve
diversity. Indeed, the subsequent history of Erie in the Supreme Court
seems most concerned with prevention of forum shopping for "outcome
determinative"'68 choice of laws. 6
9
Personal jurisdiction is outcome determinative only in the sense that
a suit which would otherwise be dismissed might be allowed to proceed
to consideration on the merits. Thus, if the federal standard for personal
jurisdiction can be satisfied when the state standard cannot, a plaintiff
16 See supra notes 1 & 159.
'6 See supra note 162.
" Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 226 (Erie citation omitted).
16 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
16? Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928).
'" See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). But see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (outcome
determinative test is not sole criterion in Erie cases).
162 See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498
(1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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would be able to obtain litigation on the merits in federal court but would
suffer dismissal without prejudice to the merits in state court. While this
is obviously of substantial benefit to a plaintiff, resort to federal court
in this context does not appear to possess exactly the same evils as the
Taxicab case. Plaintiff gains a hearing on the merits but not application
of federal substantive law different (and more favorable to him) than state
law."' Thus, little readily apparent concern attaches to the use of a federal
standard of personal jurisdiction.'
This benign conclusion ignores the full panoply of choice of law con-
siderations that might be involved in selecting a federal forum in a state
whose courts could not obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
The foremost practical application of Erie is that the federal diversity
court pretends to be a court of the state in which it sits. Thus, for exam-
ple, if the federal court in Minnesota can obtain personal jurisdiction over
a defendant when the state courts of Minnesota cannot, a substantive
law would be chosen on the basis of Minnesota's choice of law principles.1"
The potential importance of this practice is not insubstantial, as is
demonstrated by reconsidering the facts presented by Rush v. Savchuk.'
In Rush, the underlying controversy involved an attempted recovery
by a motor vehicle passenger against the allegedly negligent driver. 4
The injury was sustained in Indiana while both driver and passenger were
Indiana residents with no ostensible connection with Minnesota. Plaintiff
Savchuk moved to Minnesota some time after the accident, for purposes
unrelated to obtaining diversity jurisdiction.' 5 The United States Supreme
Court effectively held that defendant lacked sufficient contacts with
Minnesota to allow the state courts to assert personal jurisdiction. "6 It
is clear, however, that defendant Rush had sufficient contacts with the
United States so that it would not be unconstitutional for a federal court
to enter an in personam judgment against him. Minnesota would be a
proper venue for a diversity action between him and Savchuk.'" If it is
"o The federal court would still apply state law in accordance with Erie. The state law
applied could be different from the state law that would be applied in other state courts
which are able to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
This possibility of forum shopping has not inhibited the federal courts from entertaining
state court suits when the sister state court lacks jurisdiction. Even the Second Circuit,
which authored Arrowsmith, has adopted a theory of pendant personal jurisdiction, see
International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 941 (1979), and allowed joinder of claims that are not within the reach of a state's
long-arm statute to claims that are within the statute. See Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc.,
646 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1981).
... But see infra text accompanying notes 173-80 & 292-348.
" See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
,,1 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
'' Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 482, 245 N.W.2d 624, 626 (1976).
,, Rush, 444 U.S. at 322.
116 Id. at 332-33.
1 See 28 U.S.C. S 1391(a) (1976).
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assumed that service of process can be obtained on Rush,'18 there is no
obstacle to federal litigation on the merits. Minnesota choice of law rules
would govern, and, as was found in the actual litigation, Minnesota would
refuse to defer to Indiana's guest passenger statute in adjudicating the
case.' 9 Assuming arguendo that Savchuk could prove that ordinary
negligence, but not gross negligence, caused the injury, the availability
of a federal forum would result in a predictable victory for plaintiff in
a case which would fail on the merits if tried in a constitutionally
acceptable state forum such as Indiana.'" The end result of the application
of a federal standard of personal jurisdiction is precisely the kind of result-
oriented forum shopping that Erie and its progeny so clearly disapprove.
In defending the use of the federal standard, some comfort may be
sought in questioning whether service on Rush can, in reality, be
obtained. 8' It is true that no federal law would provide authorization for
extraterritorial service on facts like those set forth in Rush. Rule 4(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, would allow extrater-
ritorial service of process in accordance with state law. Since many states
routinely allow extraterritorial service of process,'82 no consistent margin
of protection against this form of forum shopping can be assured by the
difficulty of obtaining service. It is worth recalling that prior discussion
of rule 4(e) explicitly rejected the idea that federal borrowing of state
service of process provisions also borrows constitutional limitations on
personal jurisdiction.'" Thus, at least sporadic episodes will occur in which
resort to the advocated federal standard of personal jurisdiction will result
in using diversity jurisdiction as a means of forum shopping for more
favorable governing law. That the choice is between the laws of two states
rather than between state and federal law does not eliminate the
unseemliness of the practice.
18 Minnesota provides for extraterritorial service in 48 MINN. STAT. ANN., R. C. P. 4.04
(West 1979). This provision may be borrowed by the federal court sitting in diversity under
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e).
"I Rush, 311 Minn. at 496, 245 N.W.2d at 633 (Otis, J., dissenting).
.. Indiana would be a constitutionally acceptable forum and Indiana would apply its
automobile guest statute, IND. CODE S 9-3-3-1 (1982), thereby requiring proof of "wanton or
willful misconduct" which by hypothesis was not possible on these facts. The possibility
exists that there are other states with which Rush has sufficient contacts to allow them
to exercise in personam jurisdiction over claims lodged against him. Any of those states
may opt to apply a choice of law rule that ignores Indiana's guest passenger law. In such
a case, state choice of law rules would provide the same windfall to Savchuk as would
a purely federal concept of personal jurisdiction conjoined with the Erie-Klaxon doctrine.
There is some possibility that the forum state might be unable to apply its own law owing
the lack of affiliation with the subject matter of the litigation. See infra text accompanying
note 191. The possibility remains that the non-affiliated forum could choose Minnesota's
law to govern. The key point, however, is that in most instances the availability of a markedly
more favorable choice of state law will be directly attributable to a federal personal jurisdic-
tion rule and the Erie-Klaxon choice of law rule.
,8 See supra note 178.
" See supra notes 17 & 18.
13 See supra text accompanying notes 114-34.
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It is likewise unhelpful to suggest that the real evil is overly liberal
state choice of law rules rather than forum shopping engendered by the
advocated federal personal jurisdiction standard. The point is valid to
thie extent it links forum shopping to Minnesota's disregard of Indiana's
guest passenger statute,"' but restrictions on state choice of law as a
solution to the problem will not be forthcoming. 15 The Supreme Court
has shown little inclination to restrict a state's choice of law on constitu-
tional grounds. 88 Very recently, the Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague"7 allowed Minnesota to apply its own rule regarding stacking of
liability insurance policies in a case with a marked preponderance of
Wisconsin contacts.188 While the case involved no questionable assertion
of personal jurisdiction, Minnesota had little interest in the underlying
transaction until after the beneficiary of the policies moved to Minnesota
and brought suit against the insurer." Justice Brennan's plurality opinion,
as well as that of the dissenters, stressed the narrow scope of federal
constitutional review of state choice of law decisions.' Brennan noted,
and the dissenters agreed, that both full faith and credit and due process
merge into a single inquiry, requiring the state whose law is to be applied
to have "significant contacts" with the litigation.'
There is an unmistakable linguistic similarity in the standard protecting
defendants against unfair choice of law through ingenious forum shopping
and International Shoe's protection against unconstitutional assertions of
personal jurisdiction.' Examination of the precedents, however, suggests
that the minimum contacts of International Shoe are more demanding than
the significant contacts that will justify application of a particular state's
law. ' 3 The reason for the relative laxity of Supreme Court review of choice
of law is perhaps best explained by Justice Stevens' concurrence in Hague.
" See supra text accompanying note 179.
8 The textual statement and argument presume an absence of state self-restraint as
a remedy for the problem of conflicts of law.
" See, e.g., Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of Con-
stitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59 (1982); Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 872 (1980).
28 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
" Id. at 305.
18 Id.
" Id. at 312-13 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined in Justice Brennan's opinion. Justice Stevens concurred
in the judgment. Justice Powell's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist. Justice Stewart did not participate.
191 Id. at 312-13 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1" Compare Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13 with International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
"I' Compare Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1973); Clay v. Sun
Ins. Office, Ltd., 337 U.S. 179 (1964); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947);
and Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) with World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) and Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 (1978).
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Unlike the majority and most commentators,'94 Stevens asserts that full
faith and credit and due process serve separable functions relating to
"transform[ing] the several States from independent sovereigns into a
single, unified Nation,"'95 and fairness,196 respectively. Stevens notes that
almost invariably a forum state may, consistent with full faith and credit's
federalism commands, choose to advance the policies served by its own
laws in preference to those of another state." Likewise, Stevens postulates
that due process violations arising from total arbitrariness would be rare
in cases where the forum chooses its own law because it is patently
rational for judges to wish to deal with a body of law with which they
are already familiar. Thus, for Stevens, the only operative ground for
invalidation in choice of law cases is the fairness prong of due process.
Stevens argues that the crux of decided cases invalidating a forum's
choice of its own law "can be explained as attempts to prevent a State
with minimal contact with the litigation from materially enlarging the
contractual obligations of one of the parties where that party had no
reason to anticipate the possibility of such enlargement."'199 If Justice
Stevens' analysis is correct, the operative inquiry is really one aimed at
preventing frustration of justifiable expectations about governing law.
Contacts with the forum which will render application of its law
permissible need not be contacts of the defendant. In Hague, for example,
the due process inquiry is ended for Stevens by noting that Allstate had
no firm assurance that a "no stacking" rule would apply. Allstate did not
try to specify the governing law in its policies; it did not limit coverage
to occurrences in non-stacking states; it "presumably was aware that Min-
nesota law, as well as the law of most states, permitted 'stacking'."'' In
short, no unfair frustration of legitimate, expressly bargained for,
governing principles occurred.
The brief comparison 0 of the protection offered against unconstitu-
tionally unfair choice of law and unconstitutionally unfair assertions of
personal jurisdiction appears to indicate that the Supreme Court will
monitor more closely state assertions of jurisdiction than state choice of
I See, e.g., B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 188-89 (1963); Martin,
supra note 186; Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1978). For support
of Justice Stevens' view, see Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 (1976).
Hague, 449 U.S. at 322.
9 Id. at 326.
" Id. at 323 & 323 n.9.
19 Id. at 326.
199 Id. at 327 n.16.
Id. at 330.
"' For a more detailed comparison, see Martin, supra note 186. See also sources cited
id. at 877 n.32; Symposium, Choice of Law Theory After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,
10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1981).
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laws.2 Consequently, a dilemma remains for federal diversity courts
concerned with protecting defendants from '"unfair" but constitutional
state choice of law rules. The federal courts, out of comity,"2 could choose
to borrow state standards of personal jurisdiction as its own. This would
eliminate the potential forum shopping, but at the expense of unnecessarily
limiting congressionally authorized jurisdiction that can be exercised
without constitutional impediment."4 Absent any congressional expression
of intent to entertain this limitation, it seems ill-advised.0 5
Thus, the dilemma remains and must be solved either by congressional
action regarding altered federal standards for personal jurisdiction, service
of process, or venue, or by confronting the choice of laws question in search
of a rule for federal courts that avoids unfairness. The final two sections
consider each of these approaches in more detail.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL DEFINITION OF THE LIMITS OF DEFENDANT
AMENABILITY TO FEDERAL COURT AUTHORITY:
A MORE RADICAL PROPOSAL
Thus far this article has focused primarily on measuring the constitu-
tional limitations that constrain the federal courts in asserting personal
jurisdiction. A working model of an appropriate federal standard was
drawn from extending Pennoyer v. Neff s2"' concept of state sovereignty
to the Jnited States as sovereign. This standard was subsequently found
to be constitutionally permissible. The role and function of concepts such
as venue and service of process were touched upon only insofar as their
use and application related to the constitutionality of the advocated federal
standard. This section will consider in more detail a plan for congressional
modification of personal jurisdiction, service, and venue as a means of
more fully articulating and rationalizing federal assertions of judicial
power. This inquiry is undertaken against a background of congressional
reluctance to enter the field, as evidenced by the failure of the ALI
proposals. 7 to achieve enactment within more than a decade after their
development.2 8 Nevertheless, the extent to which modification of federal
... Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) with World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
The role of comity in the federal system is sometimes prominent. See, e.g., Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In the instant context situations may arise in which the forum
state's policies would in part be undermined by federal adjudication. See Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 585 (1949).
' See supra text accompanying notes 90-135.
" Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (judiciary has no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given).
2" 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
28 The final draft of the ALI proposal was published in 1969.
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service and venue provisions effectuates the rational exercise of the
federal judicial power to bind defendants remains pertinent.
A. Total Elimination of the Personal Jurisdiction
Inquiry in the Federal Courts
The baseline content of federal personal jurisdiction is insistence on
the defendant having contacts with the United States. These contacts
must be such that it is not unreasonable for the United States as a
sovereign to force the defendant to respond to the summons of its judicial
system."9 For suits involving defendants who are either United States
citizens or residents, the requirement seems to be met without need for
reflection upon the details of the case at hand."0 Accordingly, the doctrine
of personal jurisdiction will have relevance, if at all, only in the case of
nonresident foreign individuals or entities sued in the federal courts. Here,
as with diversity, article III provides adequate constitutional authoriza-
tion for Congress to act in commanding appearance."' In contrast to
intraterritorial assertions of judicial power, however, principles of inter-
national law, possibly in conjunction with International Shoe's limits on
extraterritoriality, would seem to govern the ability of the United States
to exercise jurisdiction in these cases.2"2
International law standards of amenability to personal jurisdiction are
quite amorphous,2 " stressing the need for the forum nation to have
sufficient contact with the litigation to have an interest in providing a
forum. Undoubtedly there is some measurable content to this standard,"4
but there will be relatively little occasions for its exercise. For example,
Professor Ehrenzweig, in his careful study of the genesis of Pennoyer's
misbegotten concept of "transient jurisdiction,"2 '5 traces the international
law roots of extraterritorial assertions of power. In so doing, he points
out that in the pre-Pennoyer 19th century practice in both this country
and England the courts were not hesitant to enter judgments against
persons not present within their territory on the theory that a sovereign
The Supreme Court has recently held that even a defendant who has not yet been
proved to have any contacts with the United States is still subject to the power of the
district courts to compel discovery on that issue, and defendant by refusing to comply
is thereby subject to the court's personal jurisdiction. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982).
210 It is hard to imagine a United States citizen or resident making a credible claim that
there is a lack of sufficient contacts to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a
federal court. Citizenship or residency is a sufficient contact for the exercise of jurisdiction.
2,, U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2, cl. 2.
212 See Ehrenzweig, sup-ra note 114, at 305.
213 See 2 H. READ, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 125-34 (1938).
214 See Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 797
(1955).
215 Ehrenzweig, supra note 114, at 303-09.
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had a right to protect its citizens through the operation of its judicial
system.16 This view is widely shared by other scholars.217
Even if international law checks on federal court power are rather
minimal, the assertion of extraterritorial power by the United States as
sovereign would be constitutionally subject to International Shoe's
standards for measuring presence. In light of the earlier analysis which
viewed International Shoe as the modern divining rod for exercising
sovereign power based on the presence of the defendant this conclusion
seems logically impelled by the fifth amendment.2 8 The due process
analogy, however, is inexact. The several states are, as a direct result
of the constitutional plan, no longer unlimited sovereigns. Implicit con-
cessions were made concerning the treatment that states might give to
nonlocal defendants either in deference to national unity within the United
States,219 or with respect to the need of the United States as a nation
to chart a uniform course in its dealings with foreigners.1 0 Thus constitu-
tional limitations on state judicial power over defendants are potentially
more restrictive than those limiting federal power. Far more important,
however is the fact that as to foreign affairs (which can be viewed to
include judicial jurisdiction over foreigners and foreign legal claims 1 ) there
are acknowledged "differences between the powers of the federal
government in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect
of domestic or internal affairs." Although those famous words of Justice
Sutherland were penned in a quite different context," the subsequent
conclusion that "[a]s a member of the family of nations, the right and power
of the United States in that field are equal to the right and power of
other members of the international family"4 is appropriate in regard to
the international reach of federal court authority.
Placing the United States on an equal footing in the company of other
nations does not consign to oblivion due process concerns about federal
court suits against foreign individuals and entities. It does, however, em-
216 Id. at 303-04.
217 See id. at 303-04 nn.106-08. Further, Ehrenzweig noted declension of jurisdiction over
suits involving foreigners as a matter of discretion, not compulsion. Id. at 305 & n.121.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 82-134.
219 Cf. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 146, at 631 (commerce clause limitations on states'
ability to exclude foreign business from operating within their boundries).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3 (granting power to Congress to regulate commerce
with foreign nations); see also id. art III, S 2 (granting and vesting in the Supreme Court
the bulk of jurisdiction in "Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Coun-
suls ....").Id. art. III, 5 2.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
The issue in Curtiss-Wright was whether a joint resolution of Congress, authorizing
the President to embargo arms sales to warring South American countries, if he should
determine that such an embargo would "contribute to the reestablishment of peace," and
providing criminal penalities for violation of any such embargo, was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative powers.
"4 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
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phasize the importance of balancing concern for defendants with concern
for the interests of local plaintiffs seeking enforcement of legal claims
against foreign parties.s In this context Professors Hazard and James
noted that it is widely held that the United States as sovereign is em-
powered to protect its citizens through its judicial process without regard
to the locus of the transaction involved in the litigation."
In a recent diversity suit the Supreme Court offered a degree of in-
sight into the extent of due process concern that is offered to foreign
defendants sued in the courts of the United States. The Court held that
an appropriate sanction for nonproduction of material requested through
discovery that might help to establish personal jurisdiction is the
unverified assumption that the defendants have sufficient contacts to
sustain personal jurisdiction.m In support of its decision in Insurance Corp.
of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, the Court explained
that personal jurisdiction "represents a restriction on judicial power not
as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty." 9 In
a supporting footnote the majority opinion continued, "[I]ndividual actions
cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can
subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected."' ' 0
At bedrock, while espousing the existence of personal jurisdiction as a
constitutional limitation on judicial powqr, the nature of the limitation
is modest with respect to a defendant's claim of total immunity from
litigating any issues in a distant and inconvenient forum. By its holding,
the Court found that the due process interest in individual liberty is not
offended by the sovereign's insistence that its claim of sovereign power
be subject to determination in its own courts. Thus, the due process pro-
tection granted is not a guarantee against distant and inconvenient litiga-
tion; it is merely a limitation of issues litigable at the outset.,'
Compare supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (allowing tagging of transient
defendant defensible as legislatively struck balance) with supra text accompanying notes
215-17 (international law recognized right of sovereigns to protect their citizens in suits
against absent foreigners).
"I' F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 146, at 620.
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982).
The sanction was imposed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b}(2}(A).
102 S. Ct. 2099.
Id. at 2104.
I. at 2105 n.10.
'' This point is critically important for the elimination of personal jurisdiction inquiries
in federal courts as advocated in this article. The sovereign power to command a hearing
on the sovereign's interest in adjudicating a dispute is not restricted by due process.
Accordingly the ambit of the individual liberty interest that has heretofore been served
by finding a lack of federal personal jurisdiction can, consistent with the Constitution, be
vindicated by other means, such as a transfer of venue or the granting of a forum non
conveniens dismissal. See infra text accompanying notes 265-305. Moreover, the complexity
involved in some personal jurisdiction determinations might lead one to conclude that a
distant hearing on a simpler issue might be far fairer to a defendant. Compare Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2102-23 (1982) (issue
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Granting the propriety of constitutional authority to protect United
States citizens or judicial authority, the potential for unconstitutional
jurisdictional overreaching is minimal. The problem arises only in suits
wholly between foreigners who have engaged in a transaction that has
not led them to have sufficient contact with the United States to be
deemed present under the contacts standard of International Shoe.
Assuming that the federal courts look to traditional international law
policies regarding the declension of jurisdiction and to self-interest in
averting overcrowded dockets, jurisdiction is unlikely to be extended.
Moreover, given the status of both parties as foreigners, and a transaction
packing substantial relation to the United States, seldom a suitable basis
for subject matter jurisdiction exists.3' It therefore seems safe to con-
clude that federal courts will either lack subject matter jurisdiction over
the case or invariably decline to exercise that jurisdiction in cases that
might present personal jurisdiction questions of constitutional dimension,
all without resort to express doctrines of federal personal jurisdiction.
Given that there is no constitutional role to be played by federal per-
sonal jurisdiction in international or domestic cases,' its total elimina-
tion by congressional action is appropriate.
As will be explored in detail in the next section, the bulk of the work
as to both convenience and fairness that might be served by an elaborated
concept of federal personal jurisdiction can better be addressed by
manipulation of service, venue, and occasional use of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. Before personal jurisdiction is consigned to oblivion,
because its role in protecting litigant convenience is better served by
alternative doctrines, it is important to be sure that the doctrine does
not also perform, less visible but important functions. The label jurisdic-
tion is talismanic in one respect. For example, lack of personal jurisdic-
tion has been a basis for collateral attack.' In fact, it is assumed that
of minimum contacts to sustain jurisdiction difficult to determine and alleged to involve
extensive sifting of documentary materials) with Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981) (identifying and applying with relative ease factors involved in considering motion
for forum non conveniens dismissal).
The cases would not fall in diversity jurisdiction, lacking the necessary party structure:
no party would be a citizen of the United States. Likewise, it is somewhat unlikely that
the cases would arise under federal law so as to fall within general federal question jurisdic-
tion. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976), the Foreign Service Immunities Act of 1976 does allow subject
matter jurisdiction in suits by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign government. See, Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 51 U.S.L.W. 4567 (U.S. May 23, 1983). The constitutional
mooring for such a justification is the "Arising Under" clause of article III. Id. at 4570-72.
Each § 1370 case requires consideration of whether it falls into an exception to the statutory
general rule that federal jurisdiction will exist. Id. at 4572. Cases brought in the federal
courts under this head of subject matter jurisdiction but lacking any significant contact
with the United States could be dismissed as a matter of international comity or on the
basis of forum non conveniens. Id. at 4570 n.15.
Cf Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (forum non conveniens dismissal
when foreign plaintiffs were real parties in interest in suit involving foreign plane crash).
"' See, e.g., 1B J. MOORE, supra note 91, 0.405[4.-1].
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default judgments are open to collateral attack only on the basis of lack
of jurisdiction. 5 While Professor Currie points out that there is no com-
pulsion to limit the grounds of collateral attack to jurisdictional defects
alone,"6 it is appropriate to consider whether abolition of federal personal
jurisdiction requirements should be accompanied by broadened grounds
for collateral attack.
In a system that has replaced the personal jurisdiction requirement
with designated limitations on service and venue, it would seem logical
to allow collateral attack of default judgments on the grounds of improper
service or venue. The efficacy of a judgment is, however, undermined
if collateral attack becomes more widely available. Many cases raising
service or venue issues will not be in the category of cases where those
concepts have replaced personal jurisdiction as a protection of a defen-
dant. For example, a challenge to the competency of the process server
or the manner of delivery of service should not become available as a
basis of collateral attack."7 Likewise, interpretive issues concerning
language in venue statutes such as, "where the claim arose," ' should
not be litigated collaterally. On the other side of the balance, there are
evils involved in refusing collateral attack on the grounds of serivce or
venue after these concepts have taken on a life as protectors of interests
that were formerly protected by personal jurisdiction. Refusal to expand
the grounds of collateral attack would force defendants sued in a district
court that lacks personal jurisdiction-as measured by existing
standards -to appear and contest service or venue, rather than allowing
a default to be entered in reliance on the availability of a more convenient
forum for collateral attack.
Although the inconvenience may occasionally be substantial,"9 it is
difficult to view potential defendants as having lost much if collateral
attack of federal court judgments remains limited to attacks on subject
matter jurisdiction. Even the most restrictive of current federal concep-
tions of personal jurisdiction, Arrowsmith v. United Press International,24 °
which borrows state standards, offers defendants few sure victories on
collateral attack. One need only compare the relatively narrow gap that
separates the Supreme Court majority and the dissent in their evalua-
See Currie, supra note 94, at 303-04 & n.430 (part 2).
2= Id.
' These are issues typically raised on motions to dismiss for improper service. See, e.g.,
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); see also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15,
1092; 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 1353.
' The language appears in a number of venue provisions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1391(a),
(b), (c) (1976). Attacks on venue frequently raise issues regarding where the claim arose.
See, e.g., Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
One can construct the hypothetical of a Maine resident being summoned to the United
States District Court in Guam and losing the opportunity to stay home, default, and
collaterally attack.
240 320 F.2d 219, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1963).
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tion of sufficiency of forum contacts in a case like World-Wide Volkswagen
v. Woodson' to eschew reliance on collateral attack in a case where there
is genuine doubt about the outcome on the merits."i Stated differently,
even when collateral attack is available, few defendants with viable cases
on the merits are likely to place all of their hopes on collateral litigation
of an issue as problematic as absence of personal jurisdiction. It is far
more prudent to appear in the inconvenient forum and enjoy the ability
to litigate fully both the threshold issue and the merits."a Only defen-
dants willing to forego the merits under existing doctrines of collateral
attack would be adversely affected by refusal to expand opportunities
for collateral attack to the issues of service and venue. It is submitted
that this is a small group indeed. 44 Thus, on balance, it seems preferable
to continue to limit collateral attack to jurisdictional issues, even after
funneling policy concerns relating to convenience into the realms of service
and venue.
B. Adapting Federal Service of Process,
Venue, and Forum Non Conveniens to a Broader Role
Although personal jurisdiction has been a concept of low visibility in
the federal courts, its elimination forces greater reliance on service of
process and venue limitations as the methods of assuring fair treatment
of defendants. Protection against inconvenient litigation can be offered
either through restricting the locations to which a district court's sum-
mons may run24 or by limiting the plaintiffs choices of venue to those
"1 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Compare the majority opinion, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (Defendant's
conduct and connection with forum state must be such that he could reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there. Had defendant intended his sales activity directly or indirectly
to serve the market in other states, one of those states could properly exercise jurisdic-
tion.) with Justice Brennan's dissent, id. at 306-07, 311 (One who sells automobiles can hardly
claim ignorance of their mobility or pretend they stay put where sold. There is no difference
between a case where goods reach a distant state through the distribution chain and a
case involving the same goods reaching the same state because the consumer used goods
as dealer knew he would. There is nothing unreasonable about expecting one involved in
marketing such goods to anticipate being haled into a distant state's courts.). Similar language
may be found id. at 314-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting) and id. 318-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
242 It should be recalled that on collateral attack only the jurisdictional issue is open.
No defense on the merits will be allowed. Thus, a defendant who relies upon collateral
attack foregoes any opportunity to contest the merits should the jurisdictional attack fail.
" The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow raising the jurisdictional issue at a
preliminary stage for possible determination prior to proceeding on the merits. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (g), (h). Thus, a speedy preliminary determination of the jurisdictional issue
is available without prejudice to subsequent attacks on the merits. Appellate review of
the jurisdictional issue would have to await a final decision. This too is no penalty. To
obtain immediate appellate review defendant may, as with collateral attack, opt to forego
the merits, thereby allowing an appealable final judgment to be entered.
244 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
245 The operation of the limitation is obvious: if a court's summons can only run a short
distance, only those people found a short distance from the court can be summoned. In
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which are protective of defendant's convenience. Historically, Congress
has chosen an admixture of the two methods. Since 1789, effective ser-
vice has been subject to general intraterritorial limitation.?A6 Venue has
recently taken on prominence as such a limitation, with the principal pro-
visions of the Judicial Code laying venue at the residence of the litigants,
or in the district where the claim arose.4 ' The existing system of statutes
and court rules displays little consistency in protecting defendants from
inconvenient and burdensome litigation. For example, venue in diversity
cases can properly be laid in the plaintiffs district without regard to the
defendant's interests, while the same venue is unavailable in federal ques-
tion suits between the same parties. 48 The remainder of this section will
offer suggestions for a systematic revision of the rules governing thee
areas consistent with the thesis that the federal doctrine of personal
jurisdiction should be eliminated.
1. Service of Process: The Wrong Cutting Edge
Congress could, if it chose to do so, severely limit the territorial reach
of federal court service of process. In fact, throughout the bulk of this
country's history Congress has done just that.249 Defendants under this
regimen are well protected against inconvenient federal litigation. Because
a court can only issue process within a geographically circumscribed area,
only defendants found and served within that area can be compelled to
litigate in that forum. Disregarding the previously discussed problems
of tagging transients, the protection of defendant convenience is self-
evident. To avoid unfairness to transients, further restrictions could be
placed on service of process, such as a requirement that service be made
only at a defendant's residence or place of continuing employment.2
Were Congress to restrict service of process too severely, however,
a number of competing interests would be eclipsed. The major failing of
a strict territorial limitation on service of process is the problem of suits
most cases, this limitation will insure a convenient forum for defendants so served. But
ef Ehrenzweig, supra, note 114 (transients may be found and served in a forum which is
not only inconvenient to the defendant but also has virtually no interest in the litigation).
... The original limitation provision may be found in the Judiciary Act of 1789, S 11,
1 Stat. 73, 79. The present general territorial limitation is FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
2 28 U.S.C. SS 1391-1408 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (section 1408, limiting appeals from
bankruptcy courts to only judicial district where bankruptcy court is located, is to be ef-
fective in 1984).
245 Compare 28 U.S.C. 5 1391(a) (1976) with 28 U.S.C. 5 1391(b) (1976).
2,2 See supra note 246. The general provision as stated by FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) is that "[all
process ... may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which
the district court is held ... "
I Courts routinely inquire as to whether the place of service was the defendant's
residence. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) (service at the usual place of abode). There are,
of course, drawbacks in forcing an ad hoc inquiry into whether the place of service is the
usual abode. See, e.g., 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, suprm note 15, S 1069 nn.68-90.
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involving multiple defendants who cannot all be found within the
territorially prescribed area. No suit could be successfully maintained
against two uncooperative,"' geographically dispersed defendants, because
a district able to obtain service on one such defendant would be
territorially disabled from serving the other. The twin goals of judicial
efficiency and consistency of decision'- are frustrated by forcing a plaintiff
to litigate against dispersed defendants separately.'
Another, more general, difficulty with narrow limitation of service of
process within intradistrict boundaries is that evasion of service of process
becomes easier. Potential defendants could absent themselves from the
territory in an effort to evade service of process. Even devices such as
service at home or work could be defeated by moving frequently and main-
taining no regular employment. The adverse consequences of these ac-
tivities can be minimized by allowing alternative methods of service upon
a showing by the plaintiff of inability to serve consistent with the
limitations." To allow such modifications, however, wholly undermines
the value of the original limitation. By permitting service by publication,
or any form of extraterritorial personal service, the exceptions to the
general rule of narrowly circumscribed service would vitiate protections
of defendants that are necessarily dependent on strict adherence to the
rule.
Having concluded that territorially limited service offers benefits that
are at best problematic, the alternative must be considered. Should Con-
gress opt to dispense with all territorial limitation of service, issues of
both power and prudence would arise. As to power, the discussion can
be fairly brief: Congress has the power, and the Supreme Court has
confirmed that fact. Although the leading cases on the subject, Robertson
v. Railway Labor Board"'5 and Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree'
address the question in dicta, the Court leaves the propriety of Congress'
power almost wholly unquestioned. 57 The ALI summarizes the relevant
materials in the following manner: "[M]ost existing authority ... declares
"I It should be remembered that receiving proper service is considered to be an individual
privilege of the defendant and may be waived. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) (motion to dismiss
for insufficiency of service of process), 12(g), 12(h) (provisions for waiver when 12(b) motions
are not timely made); National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (defendant
may contractually agree to appointment of a local agent to receive process in lieu of per-
sonal service).
See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 146, at 2-3.
2" Efficiency is disserved because the two suits must plow much of the same ground.
Consistency of decision is put in jeopardy should the two courts decide differently on
essentially similar evidence.
2- See, e.g., J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT RULES ANNOTATED 112-13(1962)
(noting purpose of MICH. GEN. CT. R. 105.8, which allows court discretion to adopt special
modes of service, as including cases where service is "intentionally avoided").
268 U.S. 619 (1925).
326 U.S. 438 (1946).
1 "Congress could provide for service of process anywhere in the United States." Id.
[Vol. 58:1
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
with absolute certainty that Congress has general power to make the
process of a federal court run throughout the nation.""s The underlying
premise of such power is the same recognition of national sovereignty
that supported creation of a federal standard of personal jurisdiction
uninhibited by limitations relevant to the states.n 9
Granting congressional power to authorize nationwide and even
worldwide service of process26 does not eliminate all doubts about the
wisdom of its use. Summoning a Maine resident to Guam, for example,
evokes an immediate negative reaction, especially if that defendant can
no longer rely on default and collateral attack in a case of improper forum
selection. Nevertheless, the difficulties of administering doctrines of
territorially limited yet adequate service of process do weigh against such
limitation. The appeal of unlimited service of process grows upon noting
that, apart from defendants' convenience, it is difficult to identify any
other interests protected by territorial limitations on federal service of
process." ' Thus, if the interest of defendants' convenience can be guarded
by other doctrines, limitation on federal service of process should be
abandoned.
It is the position of this article that limitation of original venue and
liberal transfer of venue can protect defendants against inconvenience
more fully and more efficiently than restrictions upon service of process.
Accordingly, Congress should authorize territorially unlimited federal
service in all cases falling within the allotted subject matter jurisdiction
of the federal courts. Apart from the benefit to those seeking to initiate
federal suits, judicial efficiency will benefit by reducing threshold litiga-
tion involving two federal service of process issues: whether there has
been compliance with the prescribed method of service and the inquiry
into whether the precribed method provides a defendant with sufficient
notice and opportunity to be heard. 62 Assuming congressional adoption
of familiar and reliable methods, such as in-hand service26 or service by
at 442. "Congress has power ... to provide that the process of every district court shall
run into every part of the United States." Id. at 622.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS Supp. Memo B, 192 (Part I 1965) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY].
= See supra text accompanying notes 82-134.
See Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972);
see also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 1133-1134; Hacker & Rotunda, The Ex-
traterritorial Regulation of Foreign Business Under the U.S. Securities Laws, 59 N.C.L. REV.
643, 666-69 (1981).
"' But cf supra text accompanying notes 47-51 (acknowledging arguments favoring limita-
tions parallel to those of state courts of the state in which a district court sits).
I See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice
by publication insufficient under the fourteenth amendment when it is not impracticable
to attempt notice by mail of known persons whose substantial property rights might be
impaired).
In Mullane, the Court stated that personal service is always adequate to give notice.
Id. at 313.
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registered mail,264 seldom, if ever, will federal courts experience litiga-
tion over the threshold issue of service of process.
2. Federal Venue: Choosing a Convenient Situs for Trial
Reflection upon a defendant's interest in convenience leads to the con-
clusion that the primary protection which he must be afforded is protec-
tion against an inconvenient situs of trial. A number of factors, considered
in detail below, combine to make this so. A further conclusion follows
from this recognition: original venue is not crucial as long as convenience-
sensitive transfer of venue provisions are available, and as long as
adequate protection is provided against forum shopping motivated by a
plaintiffs desire to obtain more favorable substantive law.26
Pursuing a policy of broad original venue, Congress could, for exam-
ple, establish venue in any district in which any party resides, or any
district that is the situs of events related to the litigation. Assuming,
arguendo, that very liberal, convenience-sensitive transfer provisions are
also in force, even this broad formulation of original venue will seldom
result in substantial hardship to a defendant. Current law already subjects
defendants to some defensive burdens with regard to suits filed in the
wrong district. It is not considered unduly unfair, for instance, that a
defendant confronted with an outrageously inconvenient venue cannot
simply default and collaterally attack attempts to enforce that default
judgment on the basis of patently improper venue.266 The court in which
the suit is filed is not obligated to initiate its own inquiry into venue.267
A defendant is obliged to appear, most likely through the offices of local
counsel, and move either for dismissal on the ground of improper venue2
or for transfer of venue in accordance with the governing statutes.269
Obviously some burden is imposed in requiring such an appearance, but
it is seldom criticized as involving substantial hardship or being unfairly
inconvenient. Rather, it is an assumed cost shared by all living under
a governing system that provides for compelled settlement of legal
disputes. All citizens are burdened by the threatened inconvenience, but
all are likewise benefitted should they become plaintiffs seeking to in-
voke the judicial system. Accordingly, adoption of broad original venue
' See Greene v. Lindsey, 102 S. Ct. 1874, 1880-81 (1982) (advocating the efficacyof mailed
service); see also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, S 1074 n.97. Congress has recently
made service by mail far more widely available. See Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1983)
(amending FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 292-348.
See Currie, supra note 94, at 303-04; id. cases cited at 304 n.430.
267 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) with id. 12(h)(1). Likewise, the low place of venue in the
hierarchy of defendant protections is also indicated by the fact that it is waivable as a
defect. See id. 12(h)(1).
268 Id. 12(b)(3).
269 See 28 U.S.C. S§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (1976).
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provisions is not, standing alone, an unfair imposition on defendants.
Combining broad original venue with worldwide service of process and
abolition of inquiry into federal personal jurisdiction is only marginally
more burdensome to defendants than the existing system. The only rele-
vant difficulty arises when it can be asserted with confidence that the
forum district, in addition to being an inconvenient or improper venue,
is also clearly without personal jurisdictibn as measured by existing federal
standards. These cases are not common.' Further, all that the defen-
dant loses by the advocated change is the previously mentioned privilege
of defaulting in reliance on collateral attack in a more convenient forum.
Liberal transfer of venue directed toward promoting convenience of litiga-
tion will allow the case to be transferred to a preferable venue in advance
of trial. Moreover, even the alleged inconvenience of trial in a distant
forum is more aptly viewed as mere annoyance, not a substantial impair-
ment of legal rights. 1
Modern legal practice, aided by enhanced long-distance communication
and travel, is easily carried on by attorneys and clients separated by
substantial distances. A defendant's lack of physical presence in the forum
district is seldom an impediment to full litigation of the case. For exam-
ple, if a distant defendant's deposition could not be taken without substan-
tial inconvenience to him it is notable that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure expressly contemplate protective orders limiting use of discovery
procedures. 2 The rules could be invoked to require that the defendant's
deposition, if requested, be taken in a location convenient to the defen-
dant. Virtually all other pretrial maneuvering can be easily undertaken
without the physical presence of the defendant." Even trial in an
inconvenient district entails few significant burdens. Deposition testimony
can be used in lieu of live appearance of witnesses,"4 and the defendant's
personal presence, although desirable, 5 is not an absolute necessity.
" See supra text accompanying notes 239-44. Not only are personal jurisdiction deter-
minations often difficult to predict, venue is in many cases limited to districts that seem
very likely to have personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1391(b) (1976). But see 28
U.S.C. S 1391(a) (1976) (allowing plaintiffs district as a proper venue in diversity).
71 For example, objections to venue will be waived unless defendant acts promptly to
assert the interest. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), (h). Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. 5 139 1(a) (1976),
Congress has allowed plaintiffs residence as a proper venue in diversity cases. Necessari-
ly, defendant will be compelled to travel outside of his home state.
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); cf. id 37(b)(2)(D) (violation of court order may be treated as con-
tempt). Note also that the court may assess costs for violation of its orders. Id. 37(b)(2).
Cf id. 30(b)(7) (allowing telephone deposition).
' See id. 32(a)(3)(B}-(E); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 2147; id. cases cited
at nn.61-71.
",5 The fact that a trial can be conducted without the defendant's physical presence does
not indicate that having the defendant present would not be preferable. First, defendant
may be able to confer with counsel about matters that transpire during the presentation
of evidence in court. Second, defendant's absence may be detrimental if it results in
influencing the trier of fact in assessment of the case.
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Finally, it should be recalled that this entire discussion is premised upon
the adoption of liberal, convenience-sensitive, transfer of venue provisions.
The availability of transfer eliminates all claims of under inconvenience,
except for those claims stemming from the need to appear in an
inconvenient forum to request the transfer.
The specific design of an original venue provision that allows the federal
courts to operate with maximal efficiency requires further refinement.
A broad, clear provision is desirable, not only as a boon to plaintiffs, but
also to prevent litigation to determine whether the venue chosen by plain-
tiff is proper. Extended threshold litigation will be avoided if the statutory
tests for measuring the propriety of a particular venue are easily applied.
By these criteria, the venue standard suggested above, allowing suit at
the residence of any party or at the situs of events related to the litiga-
tion, seems apt." The standard should be narrowed only if doing so would
achieve benefits without sacrificing either judicial efficiency or the
system's ability to insure that the trial is held in a convenient district.
It is possible to criticize the suggested factors as being too liberal. Even
the ALI only suggests that a defendant's residence or the place where
a "substantial part" of the events took place should be proper original
venues. 7 The additional breadth of the standard discussed above would
accommodate the situation where the plaintiff's residence is the optimum
place for trial (due to the presence of witnesses or evidence there), yet
that district is not a place where a substantial part of the events related
to the litigation occurred. Seldom, however, will plaintiffs residence be
a convenient place of trial while failing to be the situs of events
significantly related to the litgation. Thus, contraction of the original venue
provision to a formulation more closely in line with the ALI proposal would
not often prevent attainment of an optimal place for trial. Further, if the
convenience-sensitive transfer of venue provision may be invoked by plain-
tiffs as well as defendants, the possibility of precluding litigation in the
most convenient forum is totally avoidedY Other benefits related to
prevention of forum shopping for favorable choice of law may inhere in
"' The language, "situs of events related to the litigation," is intended to be a more
permissive standard than, for example, "where the claim arose." See 28 U.S.C. S 1391 (1976).
" ALI STUDY, supra note 258, S 1303.
"' The trade-off here is evident: plaintiff must file in a district that is designed to offer
some protection to defendant's convenience interest. Plaintiff's convenience interest is slightly
burdened by having to make a motion for transfer to a more convenient district when
that district is the residence of the plaintiff and not the situs of substantial events connected
with the litigation. This seems to be an unusual case, but not unthinkable. Cf. Product
Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974 (foreign corporation entering
into contract with Texas corporation to test product was amenable to suit in Texas even
though it had no place of business there and performed no physical act of any sort in Texas).
It should be noted that unlike the standard of the major existing transfer of venue provision,
28 U.S.C. 5 1404 (1976), transfer as proposed would include transfer to venues that were
not proper originally. See infra text accompanying notes 282-83.
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eliminating the plaintiffs residence as a possible original venue.' Finally,
and most compelling, this modest limitation on venue pretermits many
opportunities for selecting a district located in a state that could not ob-
tain personal jurisdiction over defendant. 2 0 Denial of the plaintiff's
residence as a proper original venue may also reduce the efficacy of
"'nuisance suits" brought with hopes of obtaining a settlement offer rather
than a victory on the merits. Plaintiffs may forego such suits in an un-
familiar jurisdiction, while defendants may be somewhat less likely to
settle if they can pursue summary disposition with minimal effort.
Having settled on a general original venue formulation that lays venue
in any district in which a defendant resides, or a district having a
significant relationship to the litigation,281 it remains to develop an
appropriate transfer provision. The goal of transfer of venue in the ad-
vocated system is solely to allow trial in the most convenient location.
Accordingly, the provision should invariably allow transfer to any district
that satisfies that criterion. Unlike current practice, transfer need not
be restricted to venues that would be available as proper original venues."
Moreover, maximum flexibility in attaining the desired trial venue is
enhanced by allowing any party, not merely defendants, to seek transfer.m
Statutory enactment of a provision allowing for such transfers seems
rife with possibilities for extended threshold battles over transfer motions.
In practical terms, postponement of appellate review until after entry
of a final judgment' will leave no effective remedy for district court errors
except the grant of a new trial in a more convenient forum. Alternatively,
"I See infra text accompanying notes 292-333. As will be seen, this becomes particularly
important if the federal courts, sitting in diversity, are viewed as being required to adopt
the choice of law rule of the state courts of the states in which they sit.
m Personal jurisdiction, particularly in cases like World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), seems to turn on
defendant's relationship to the forum. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 291-92; Rush, 444 U.S.
at 329. Accordingly, elimination of plaintiff's residence as a venue choice seems to limit
proper original venues to districts that will be more likely to have a sufficient relation
to the defendant to command appearance and answer.
11 The formulation chosen is similar to the ALI proposal in adopting a defendant or
contacts with the litigation standard, but is more liberal in regard to the formulation of
the standard, both as to requiring only the presence of any defendant and as to the degree
of contact necessary between the litigation and the forum. Cf. ALI STUDY, supra note 241,
5 1303 (all defendants, substantial part of the events giving rise to the litigation). When
the defendant is not a resident of the United States, however, the ALI formulation is more
liberal: suit may be instituted in any district. Id. When jurisdiction is based on a federal
question, the ALI formulation is very similar. See id. S 1314. The differences relate to cases
in which no district satisfies either of the primary criteria mentioned above.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
There appears to be no limitation on plaintiffs bringing transfer of venue motions
under current practice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), (b) (1976). See also C. WRIGHT, supra note
5, § 44, at 187 & n.31.
The general rule in the federal courts is to review only final judgments. See 28 U.S.C.
1291 (1976). It is doubtful whether the statutory exceptions to the rule would be ade-
quate to allow interlocutory review of transfer motions. See 28 U.S.C. S 1292 (1976).
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to allow interlocutory review of decisions of transfer motions invites ex-
penditure of energy and money on an issue other than the merits. To
avoid the horns of this dilemma, it is possible to make the rulings on
transfer motions unreviewable by the appellate courts as has been done
with orders to remand to state courts cases previously removed to federal
court.85 Little benefit is likely to accrue from appellate review of these
decisions. In ruling on a motion for transfer, the district judge is involved
in weighing factors which determine the ease of trial in a particular loca-
tion. The assessment requires consideration of rather uncomplicated
factual matters288 and the drawing of an ad hoc conclusion which would
have no precedential value. ' Assuming good faith on the part of the trial
court, there is no reason to suspect that appellate review will reach a
superior determination of the best place for trial.
If one fears that trial judges will transfer cases for reasons unrelated
to convenience of litigation, then Congress could enumerate the allowable
factors for trial court consideration288 and the appellate courts could police
adherence through mandamus,289 even in the face of statutes denying
appellate review."' Finally, some provision should be made for the mak-
ing of a second transfer motion, even if the initial motion was granted.
New evidence about convenience, not discoverable through the exercise
of due diligence at the time of the initial motion, should be allowed a
role in the determination of the best place for trial. To prevent abuse
of this additional device, however, either the standard for its granting
should be more rigorous, requiring, for example, a showing of substan-
tially enhanced convenience, or sanctions should be imposed for misuse
of the motion. 9 '
285 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1976).
Little complication should be expected from matters such as where witnesses reside,
where parties are located, and the relative difficulty of traveling to that forum for litiga-
tion. These seem to be relatively objective determinations, likely to be of little controversy
as to their substance.
287 The conclusion to be drawn from the facts is, of course, a highly subjective balancing
of many factors. It seems unlikely that appellate review offers, a priori, any likelihood
of a more informed choice than that of the district judge. Likewise, the conclusion reached
could not be seen as binding on any future courts in balancing a different set of facts.
This is similar to the enunciation of factors relevant to forum non conveniens dismissals.
See the discussion of the standards in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), infra
note 303.
' 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
'- See 28 U.S.C. S 1447(c) (1976), construed in Thermtron Prod., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,
423 U.S. 336 (1976) (limited review of unreviewable remand order to insure that remand
was based on factors properly to be considered by the district court).
" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4), which generally allows for imposition of
sanctions for improper party behavior in discovery matters, might serve as an example
for a sanctions provision. Congress has resorted to some rule-specific sanctions more narrowly
tailored to the situation. See Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1983) (amending FED. R.
Civ. P. 4 and inserting subsections (cl(2)(C) and (D) which provide for award of actual costs
of personal service if party properly served by mail does not acknowledge receipt of process).
This latter approach seems preferable.
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3.' Forum Non Conveniens: Convenience and Foreign Disputes
Previous discussion has indicated that there exists a class of cases so
little affiliated with the United States that they should not be heard in
the federal court system. Under the advocated system of worldwide
service of process, liberal venue, and no limitation of personal jurisdic-
tion, these cases can find their way to federal court if some basis for
subject matter jurisdiction can be found.2" To prevent this, the existing
doctrine of federal forum non conveniens should continue to operate as
it has for at least one-third of this century."' Current practice allows forum
non conveniens dismissals in suits involving domestic" as well as foreign
litigants.29 Conveniently, current practice also allows consideration of
forum non conveniens motions prior to the court's determination of
jurisdiction. As Chief Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New
York has noted: "While it is true that the question of authority to exercise
jurisdiction is logically prior to the decision to exercise it, an early deci-
sion on forum non conveniens cannot prejudice a plaintiff as might a
premature decision on the merits."'298
Not surprisingly, the decisional process involved in these dismissals
operates in much the same way as would convenience-sensitive transfers
among the federal courts, except that the remedy must necessarily be
limited to dismissal owing to the inability to transfer a case to a foreign
court. Under present law, the remedy of dismissal and refiling in a more
appropriate forum, as opposed to interdistrict federal transfer of venue,
carries choice of law consequence.17 Under the advocated proposals, this
important difference between convenience-sensitive federal transfer of
venue and forum non conveniens dismissal would continue. A subsequent
proposal298 would require all federal courts, transferor or transferee, to
make the same choice of law. Of course, after a forum non convenience
dismissal, the subsequent foreign nonfederal forum would be free to make
its own choice of law.
299
See supra text accompanying note 232.
293See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. Lumberman's Mut.
Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (California administratrix
suing American domestic corporations).
2 9 See, e.g., Murty v. Aga Khan, 92 F.R.D. 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (United States citizen
suing French citizen).
Id. at 482.
Compare Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (requiring transferee district to
apply the law that would have been applied by transferor district) with Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247-55 (1981) (specifically rejecting the relevancy of the com-
parative choice of substantive law as a factor in deciding forum non conveniens motions).
2' See infra text accompanying notes 334-48.
This dichotomy conforms precisely with the concept of a unitary system of United
States courts. Within the United States, results will be uniform and the exercise of jurisdic-
tion will be limited by constitutional concerns regarding subject matter jurisdiction and
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Concern might arise that the forum non conveniens inquiry, because
of its choice of law consequences, will expand and confound the federal
courts, thereby nullifying the efficiency gained by eliminating all inquiry
into personal jurisdiction. °0 The substitution of one cutting edge for
another is in this instance, however, a significant advantage. The forum
non conveniens inquiry isolates convenience as the value to be protected,
untrammelled by nebulous concepts such as minimum contacts. The most
probative facts are relatively easy to assemble: the identity and location
of parties and witnesses, and the situs of tangible evidence that will be
needed at trial.3 1' There is no concern with the subjective expectations
of parties to the suit or complicated facts regarding the operations of
an enterprise over a period of time as is the case in modern personal
jurisdiction litigation. 2 Further, the legal rules governing forum non con-
veniens discourage protracted litigation. The Supreme Court has adum-
brated a series of factors, both of public and private interest, that are
relevant to deciding the motion, 3 and it has expressly limited the scope
of appellate review:
practical concerns about the optimum place for trial. If trial in a foreign nation is called
for, the jurisdiction of the United States will be declined.
Foreign courts would not necessarily make the same choice of law as would the United
States federal courts. Foreign and domestic litigants in cases having substantial interna-
tional aspects who find the federal court choice of law to their disadvantage would predictably
file motions seeking forum non conveniens dismissals. Two caveats are necessary in
evaluating how many cases are involved. First, good faith belief in the merits of the motion
is required. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and 7(b)(2) (signature of attorney is affidavit that pleading
or motion is not interposed for delay or without belief in its merit). Second, most federal
cases involve only domestic litigants and domestic issues not implicating forum non conve-
niens principles.
"' Cf. supra text accompanying notes 284-90 (discussion of efficacy of committing such
inquiries to district courts).
3o" See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (whether
defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there"); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (speaking of defendant's "purposeful availment" of the forum state);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (analyzing at length the defendant's
modus operandi).
The private interest factors include:
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to
the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the
enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). The Third Circuit in Reyno v. Piper
Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 160 (1980) (footnotes omitted) further described the Gilbert test:
Also relevant is the inability to implead other parties directly involved in the
controversy. These various ingredients are weighed to determine the "relative
advantages and obstacles to fair trial."
Among the public interest factors are a) problems of creating court conges-
tion and imposing jury duty in litigation centers that are removed from the
origin of the controversy, and b) benefits of holding the trial in a place accessible
to the witnesses to the accident and of having the trial in a forum where the
court is familiar with the law governing the case rather than having a court
elsewhere untangle foreign law.
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The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has
been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all
relevant public and private public interest factors, and where its
balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substan-
tial deference.3 4
Thus, while forum non conveniens motions may be more hotly contested
than interdistrict transfer of venue motions because of the potential choice
of law consequences,3 0 5 there is no reason to fear that the difficulty
attending personal jurisdiction litigation will be reintroduced under a
different banner.
V. MODIFYING FEDERAL CHOICE OF LAW: THE CONCOMITANT
OF REVISED JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINES
Thus far this article has developed a model of federal courts unen-
cumbered by doctrines restricting personal jurisdiction, territorial limits
on service of process, or narrowly circumscribed choice of venue. Assembly
of the model was preceeded by a thorough examination that demonstrated
the extremely narrow ambit of constitutional restraints upon Congress
in shaping these aspects of the federal judicial system. In a similar man-
ner, it is apparent that Congress or the federal judiciary could fashion
a federal rule of choice of law for all cases heard in federal courts without
regard to the type of cause of action involved. The only possible constitu-
tional constraint derives from that part of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins"6
that commands that state law must govern in diversity actions, but which
does not specify which state's law must govern in case of conflicts. Whol-
ly apart from the constitutional teaching of Erie, there is also an impor-
tant federalism interest in preventing litigants from using the availabili-
ty of concurrent federal diversity jurisdiction to obtain a more favorable
choice of substantive law."8 This section will explore possible choice of
law rules that will minimize federal forum shopping for more favorable
governing law.3 9
Choice of law concerns are somewhat more pressing under the
advocated federal system than they are under existing law. This situa-
tion results from the current federal diversity practice of trying to act
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
The court in considering the motion is not to concern itself with what the choice of
law impacts will be. Id. at 265.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See infra notes 319-46 and accompanying text. But f. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) (general considerations of our federal system require diver-
sity court application of forum district state's choice of law rule).
-"' Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (outcome of litigation should be
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome, whether brought in
state or federal court).
I See infra text accompanying notes 314-48.
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like the courts of the state in which the district court is located. 1 °
Liberalization of service and venue, when coupled with abandonment of
all inquiry into personal jurisdiction, results in a somewhat wider choice
of originally available federal fora. Liberal transfer of venue does not
reduce the problem, for existing precedents require that the transferee
forum apply substantive law as though it were the transferor forum."'
Thus, whenever the proposed standards allow a suit to be commenced
in a district court located in a state whose courts would be unable to
hear the action,1 2 the potential for choice of law mischief is present if
one adheres to current federal policies governing choice of law in diversi-
ty actions.
A careful exegesis will show that there are four distinct types of choice
of law problems that are potentially affected by liberalized federal asser-
tions of power over defendants. Diversity cases account for only two of
the four. The feature that distinguishes the two types of diversity cases
is the availability of a state court able to summon and obtain jurisdiction
of all the parties to the case. The classic diversity case, pitting a single
plaintiff against a single defendant, typifies the first type,1 3 while cases
involving more complicated dispersed party structure will occasionally
result in the other." Alteration of the threshold doctrines regarding
personal jurisdiction, service, and venue also creates an impetus to forum
shop in federal question cases. This created impetus may seem anomalous
in view of the supposed national uniformity of federal law, but there are
two distinct situations in which a choice between districts may also involve
a choice of governing federal law. First, federal law occasionally borrows
state law as an express element of federal law. Longshoremen's injury
claims in admiralty are an example of this type of borrowing.1 Second,
federal law, although ultimately capable of unification through the ap-
pellate process, is not always in that unified state. Conflicts among cir-
cuits on important points of federal law are not uncommon,1 ' which creates
the possibility that a plaintiff might seek to initiate suit in a district bound
3. See supra notes 307-08.
. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
3I The potential is limited to cases where the law that would be applied by the state
which would otherwise be unavailable is different from, and more favorable to, the plain-
tiff than the law that would be applied by the states whose courts could hear the litigation.
See infra text accompanying notes 31848.
313 Clearly, if there is only one defendant, the courts of the state in which that defendant
resides could obtain personal jurisdiction, thereby creating an available state forum for
the litigation.
314 For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), if
the driver of the vehicle that rear-ended plaintiffs could not be sued in a state in which
all of the defendants involved in manufacturing and marketing plaintiffs vehicle could also
be sued, no state could assemble all of the defendants.
313 See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981).
316 Cf. Weiner, Federal Regional Courts: A Solution to the Certiorari Dilemma, 49 A.B.A.
J. 1169 (1963) (suggesting regional courts of appeals to resolve intercircuit conflicts).
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to apply the more favorable precedent 17 To the extent that a broader
choice of original federal forum is created by the previously advocated
provisions, increased danger of forum shopping is encountered. Thus, while
diversity cases present more acute problems of forum shopping, federal
choice of law rules for all cases can be devised which are more responsive
to the needs of a federal system than is the existing federal practice.
The most controversial of the four classes of potential forum shopping
cases would arise in those instances in which there is some state court
that could provide an adequate hearing of the suit.3 18 Adequacy in this
context refers to the ability of a state to summon and bind all of the
parties to the suit. The current choice of law rule in diversity cases is
that a federal court applies the law that would be applied by a court of
the state in which it sits. 19 If the previously advocated revisions in federal
practice allow the suit to be initiated in a federal court in a state that
cannot assemble all of the parties, and that state's choice of law is substan-
tially more favorable to the plaintiff than the law chosen by the available
state court, the notorious evil of the Taxicab case would appear to be
resurrected.' The fortuitous availability of diversity of citizenship will
grant a windfall to plaintiffs. The ultimate Erie embarrassment of
obtaining different results in federal and state courts located around the
corner from one another32 ' will not be present, but the availability of a
federal forum may substantially affect the outcome of the litigation."
The alternative of doing nothing to ameliorate this situation and
suffering occasional choice of law consequences that favor plaintiffs is not
wholly unattractive. Recalling that the advocated choice of original venue
provision was limited to the residence of any defendant or to a district
where events related to the litigation occurred," it is evident that
frequently cases can be litigated in the state courts of these districts.
In part this is a result of the extensive growth of state statutes asserting
personal jurisdiction and providing for extraterritorial service of process;=
in part it is due to the fact that residence of the defendant, or occurrence
of events related to the litigation, are likely to provide the constitutionally
317 The hierarchical structure of the federal courts require district courts to follow the
precedent of their own circuits. See, e.g., 1B J. MOORE, supra note 91, 0.402[1], at 61 & n.29.
3,' This case is most controversial because it is the only case where the plaintiff obtains
a windfall choice of law by opting for federal suit when an adequate state forum is never-
theless available.
31. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
' See supra note 167. The evil is, of course, allowing the fortuity of diversity and the
consequent invocation of federal jurisdiction, to obtain a more favorable choice of law. In
this case the more favorable law chosen is state law rather than general federal common law.
See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
See infra text accompanying notes 323-26.
See supra text accompanying note 276.
The long-arm and associated extraterritorial service provisions of California are not
atypical of the current crop of statutes. See supra notes 17-18.
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required degree of presence or contact that will allow a state to exercise
judicial power over the defendant.2 25 Nonetheless, the new venue provi-
sion is not a guarantee that a state court of the state in which the district
court sits could obtain personal jurisdiction of all defendants. The
advocated venue provision looks to the residence of any defendant, not
that of all defendants. 26 Second, as illustrated by Justice White's logic
in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,"1 districts having a relation to
the litigation are not always districts with which the defendants will have
sufficient contact to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Thus,
if no changes are made in federal choice of law rules while new views
on personal jurisdiction, service, and venue are adopted, the result will
provide choice of law shopping opportunities to plaintiffs.
Two amelioratives are available. The existing federal rule which
requires a federal court to pretend, for diversity choice of law purposes,
to be a state court of the state in which it sits 8' could be abandoned,
either totally or only in cases where the courts of the state in which it
sits are unavailable. It is possible to make a strong case against both
possible ameliorative choice of law rules. To create a new, unique, and
universally applicable federal choice of law rule might generate
occurrences of a federal district court and the courts of its host state
applying different law. If, for example, the federal rule is a lex loci rule,
every diversity case tried in the federal courts located in a non-lex loci
state 29 involving events that took place outside of the state will present
possible state-federal forum shopping opportunities for more favorable
governing law. If those state courts are able to entertain the litigation,
adopting a federal choice of law rule exacerbates, rather than solves, the
forum shopping problem. The presence of diversity will result in
potentially varied results between a district court and the state court
of the state in which it sits.ns Further, the resulting system also encounters
embarrassment in removed cases when the federal choice of law rule would
favor the defendant.
3
'
See supra text accompanying notes 82-90.
See supra text accompanying notes 276-83.
444 U.S. 286, 292, 294-95. In World-Wide, the automobile accident occurred in the forum
state, a most significant contact.
See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 262
N.E.2d 593 (1970); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
1 This is thought to be the ultimate evil. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 109 (1945): "The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is
that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in federal
court instead of in a State court a block away would not lead to a substantially different
result." See also id. at 111: "The main foundation for the criticism of Swift v. Tyson was
that a litigant in cases where federal jurisdiction is based only on diverse citizenship may
obtain a more favorable decision by suing in the United States courts." (quoting York v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 532 (1944) (Hand, J., dissenting)).
11 It is presumed that upon removal the choice of law rule would remain the same, thereby
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The other ameliorative, adopting a special choice of law rule only for
cases where the state courts of the forum district are unavailable,
recreates much of the burdensome dependence on irrelevant state limita-
tions that militated for the adoption of a distinct set of federal amenability
standards. To be sure, a federal court suit may now be brought in a
location that was previously unavailable, but the efficiency gains of
pretermitting almost all threshold litigation about service and personal
jurisdiction are lost.' Those numerous state-law questions would simply
become part of the determination of whether the federal court would be
required to follow the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.
If the federal court finds its state's courts would be able to entertain
the lawsuit, then the host state's choice of law rule is employed. If,
however, those courts would be unavailable, invocation of a federal choice
of law rule does not end the threat of forum shopping. It remains possible
that the law chosen by a federal rule would be different from the law
chosen by any available forum state. The logic that abhors substantively
important choice of law differences based on the fortuity of diverse citizen-
ship is again offended. To remedy this defect and insure that the choice
of law rule is that of an available state requires further inquiry into the
availability of other states. If more than one such state proves to be
available, and if there would be a discrepancy in their choice of law deter-
minations, the federal court would then have to fashion a means by which
to choose among those competing choice of law rules. Thus, protracted
litigation over otherwise irrelevant issues of state court power would
plague a narrowly applicable federal choice of law rule.
Having chronicled major weaknesses of the choice of law possibilities,
it remains to select the one having the least offensive consequences. The
advocated changes regarding federal personal jurisdiction, service, and
venue will require abandonment if no choice of law rule can prevent con-
sequences so harmful as to outweigh the benefits of placing federal judicial
power on a clear and easily applied federal basis. Although some may
think doing nothing to change present practice is preferable, 3 adoption
of a federal choice of law rule applicable in all cases is not so unattractive
benefiting the defendant should the federal choice of law rule pick the law of a state that
is more favorable to the defendant. This need not be true. That is, the benefits of forum
shopping can be reserved to plaintiffs by limiting the applicability of the federal choice
of law rule to cases of original federal jurisdiction, treating removed cases as though they
are cases in the state courts of the state in which the federal court sits. This seems unfair
and somewhat contradictory, given the policy arguments that follow. See infra text
accompanying notes 334-48.
1 To know whether to apply the choice of law rule, the federal court would be required
to measure both the possibility of achieving good service and that of obtaining personal
jurisdiction in the state court.
I See ALI STUDY, sup-ra note 58, app. A, at 166-67 (describing as "unsound" the congres-
sional creation of a federal choice of law rule to replace the doctrine of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)).
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as to scuttle the whole enterprise of altering federal assertions of judicial
power.
To put matters in perspective, assume that either CongressM or the
Supreme Court s adopts a federal choice of law rule applicable in all federal
court litigation. Assume further that the chosen rule is in the nature of
a most significant relationship test.36 Although the precise application
of this standard will become clear only after some experience in using
it, it does not seem to be outrageously mutable. Speaking abstractly,
having but one federal standard is laudable in terms of both efficiency
and internal consistency within the nationwide system of federal courts.
No effort will be spent searching unfamiliar bodies of choice of law rules,
and any particular case will have the same law chosen as governing
without regard to the location of trial, or the laying of proper original
venue. These efficiency benefits will obtain in both types of diversity cases
and in both types of federal question cases described above as posing
problems of forum shopping. With all federal courts applying the same
choice of law rule, the choice between courts within the federal system
will be a matter of indifference as to substance. The federal rule will tend
to have a leveling effect, especially if it is applied in both original jurisdic-
tion and removed cases. If either plaintiff or defendant could benefit from
a federal forum, and either plaintiff or defendant could elect a federal
forum, one would expect that a federal forum would be chosen in all cases
where federal choice of law diverges markedly from state choice of law.'
The dichotomy in forum shopping will be limited to choosing between
the federal choice of law rule and the state choice of law rule.
Adoption of a purely federal choice of law rule creates the potential
embarrassment of occasionally divergent results, depending on whether
a case is tried in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction or
in the state court "one block away.""ns Albeit embarrassing, the likelihood
Congress could enact legislation pursuant to the necessary and proper power in relation
to its authority in creating and governing the federal courts. See supra note 162.
" The Supreme Court could adopt this rule as a matter of federal common law govern-
ing litigation in the federal courts. Cf. Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1975).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 145(1) (1971).
= If one shares the view that relatively liberal choice of law rules, such as Minnesota's,
should be disfavored in a federal system, this leveling effect is not disquieting. But cf.
Sedler, supra note 186 (advocating liberal "interest analysis" choice of law rules in cases
such as Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)). Even if one agrees with Professor
Sedler that the states should not be subject to intrusive constitutional limitations on choice
of law, it is still possible to favor a federal court system making its choice of law decisions
without reference to the parochial concerns of an individual state.
It is not clear that the "leveling effect" will indeed occur. The experience of an earlier
era in the wake of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), points toward continued state
adherence to divergent rules of law. But cf. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction,
73 YALE L.J. 7, 9-13 (1963) (discussing the positive effects of continued federal diversity
jurisdiction on state court decisional processes).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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of providing a true windfall to plaintiffs is not great. If an alternate forum
could be found that applies the same law that would be chosen by a purely
federal choice of law rule, plaintiff has gained very little. It must be
assumed that a plaintiff sophisticated enough to select the benefit of a
federal choice of law rule is also sophisticated enough to initiate suit in
a state that would apply more favorable law, if that was the only means
of obtaining the choice of law benefit. Frequently, the state having the
most significant relationship to the litigated events, the state's whose
law will be chosen by the advocated federal choice of law rule, will be
an available forum. The acts which provide that state with a substantial
relationship to the legal dispute are, for the most part, acts of parties
occurring within that state. The occurrence of acts in the state are the
same sort of indicia that accompany a finding of presence in the due
process context. 9 If the state is not a constitutionally impermissible choice
of forum under the circumstance, most frequently such a state will be
available to hear the litigation."0 As a result, the cases in which diversity
jurisdiction provides the only lever that allows plaintiffs to obtain an other-
wise unavailable and more favorable governing law are relatively rare.
They should not, therefore, be seen as significant enough to outweigh
the benefits of a unified and streamlined system of federal personal
jurisdiction, service of process, and venue.
In the multiparty diversity setting, where there is, by definition,41 no
state that could serve as a forum for the litigation, the advantages of
a uniform federal rule regarding choice of law are more readily apparent.
If federal suit can be brought under current practice, 2 one can confidently
predict that plaintiffs will be doing a good deal of forum shopping, and
will seek to commence suit in a state offering the most favorable choice
of law." That choice of law would be applied, in turn, by the district
court sitting in that state. Cases of this sort are not invariably cast out
of the federal courts under prevailing federal practice despite the fact
that no state court could hear the case. Congress has permitted the federal
courts to hear certain of these cases, in some instances precisely because
I See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 898-99, 458 P.2d 57,
61-62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117-18 (1969) (en banc).I A state that could constitutionally assert personal jurisdiction might be an unavailable
forum for one of three reasons: (1) it may not have an adequate method of extraterritorial
service to successfully summon a defendant; (2) it may not have a comprehensive long-arm
statute which asserts jurisdiction over the particular type of dispute or circumstances
involved; or (3) the state may limit the availability of its courts via so-called "door closing"
statutes that bar litigation of certain claims.
" See supra text accompanying notes 313-14.
32 There are some instances in which Congress has expressly created the possibility
of a federal forum in the absence of any.available state forum. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1335,
1397 (1976; 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1978).
See infra text accompanying notes 34546.
u" Cf. ALI STUDY, supra note 258, at 120-31 (urging multiparty, multistate diversityjurisdiction).
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of the potential unavailability of a state forum. 4 For example, frequently
there will be no state court capable of assembling all the needed parties
to an interpleader action. Federal courts, pursuant to minimal diversity
jurisdiction34 combined with special service and venue provisions"
routinely hear these cases and thereby provide a valuable national judicial
service. To argue that these cases reflect either a special congressional
interest in the subject, or a unique federal court role in a federal system
populated principally by territorially limited state sovereigns simply
strengthens the position advocated in this article: federal courts should
not, without good reason, be cast in a mold fitted for courts of a different
and less powerful sovereign just because they are exercising diversity
jurisdiction.
When adjudicating a federal question lawsuit, there can be no reason
to doubt the propriety of having a federal court apply a federal choice
of law standard if an issue arises requiring that a choice be made. The
integrity of a unified system of federal courts is best maintained by having
the same law applied to a suit without regard to the situs of filing or
trial.47 Once again the proffered standard of most significant relationship
would serve to avoid variance when federal question cases present ques-
tions of governing law. This is true in both types of federal choice of
law situations described above.
When state law is to be borrowed to form an element of federal law,
the circumstances that prompt either Congress or the Supreme Court
to borrow state law' are usually related to the highly localized nature
of the activity being regulated thereby allowing easy and consistent
application of the most significant relationship rule. Many borrowings
involve personal injury situations in which the law of the place of injury
will be the only law which can plausibly be described as having the most
significant relationship to the event sued upon. This is especially likely
when it is recognized that the United States as sovereign, unlike the
states, has no interest in promoting the policies of any one of the several
states in preference to that of another. Forum shopping for choice of law
-' See 28 U.S.C. 5 1335 (1976). Minimal diversity simply requires that any plaintiffs state
citizenship be diverse from any defendant's. Complete diversity is the general rule for
diversity, established by Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
6 28 U.S.C. S 1397, 2361 (1976).
3" Forum shopping within the federal system will be totally eliminated by such a rule
working in conjunction with a convenience-sensitive transfer of venue provision. There
is simply nothing to be gained by seeking a different district for filing of a case. This compares
favorably with current practice, where a great deal may be gained by original filing in
a district offering a more favorable choice of law.
11 Either the court or Congress may adopt a borrowing rule. See, e.g., United States
v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (court borrowed state law); Reconstruction Fin. Corp.
v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946) (construing S 10 of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation Act as amended, 47 Stat. 5, 9, 55 Stat. 248, as a congressional borrowing of
state definitions of real property).
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is avoided, yet the ease of bringing suit and convenience to litigants are
promoted by the advocated changes in federal law.
In the case of conflicts between the circuits as to the meaning of federal
law, application of a choice of laws analysis is novel, but beneficial. Forcing
all of the district courts in which a particular federal question lawsuit
may be brought to attempt to apply the same choice of then conflicting
federal law helps to unify the federal court system. It will prevent some
windfall benefits from accruing to plaintiffs as a result of conflicts between
the circuits. Thus, results in the federal court system will be less arbitrary,
and the possibility exists that the added awareness of conflicts and
potential conflicts may result in greater cohesiveness among the circuits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having embarked on a study of personal jurisdiction in the federal
courts, the compass has swung past service of process to venue and to
choice of law. Perhaps this is not surprising, given the inherent redun-
dancy of the first three concepts when applied to the United States as
sovereign. Modern methods of travel and communication and the often
complex nationwide nature of legal controversies have rekindled the need
for federal action to nationalize and unify the behavior of the lower federal
courts. The power of a national sovereign to command appearance in its
courts in any case having a meaningful relationship with its territory or
its citizens is not novel, and self-restraint in exercising the power is no
longer necessitated by the physical realities of an earlier era. Convenience
of litigation is still a valuable concern, but due process cannot be viewed
as requiring stringent limitations on forum availability especially in light
of modern procedures that facilitate conducting litigation at great
distances from one's home. Instead, convenience is now an end in itself,
best served by procedural devices that directly operate to promote it.
Restructuring the federal court system in recognition of the lack of
constitutional constraints on congressional choices in this area allows pur-
suit of a more unified federal system. The threshold barriers to invoking
the federal judicial power can be vastly simplified, allowing litigants opt-
ing for a federal forum to proceed with a minimum of wasteful procedural
litigation. Both the personal jurisdiction inquiry and territorial limitations
on federal service of process can be wholly eliminated. Original venue
can then be laid in all districts in which a defendant resides or in districts
having a significant relationship to the litigation. Transfer of venue should
be readily available to ensure convenience of litigation.
The price of this more efficient system of federal courts is the knowledge
that in a few cases federal courts adjudicating a lawsuit will reach a dif-
ferent result than would state courts. The disparity of results will occa-
sionally lead to some forum shopping between the state and federal courts
to secure a more favorable choice of law. While this is true, the possible
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occurrences are limited in number by the establishment of a universally
applicable federal choice of law rule which applies the law of the state
having the most significant relationship to the litigation. In mediating
disputes presenting a potentially significant choice of law, it is difficult
to call this choice unfair to litigants who have engaged in multistate ac-
tivities. Moreover, in most cases a plaintiff would be able to select a
nonfederal forum applying this law. Thus, application of the federal choice
of law rule will seldom grant litigants the unseemly benefit of a victory
rather than a defeat through the selection of a federal rather than a state
tribunal. Even when choice of law is critical, the result is not born of
federal imposition of federal law as governing. Rather, the conflict of law
to be mediated arose from federalism's attempt to rely on the several
states as sovereign expositors of their own laws regulating primary con-
duct. Federal oversight of interstate disputes is necessary, and the adop-
tion of a universal choice of law rule for the federal courts is no more
contemptible than the wooden application of the local state's rule. On
balance, one must conclude that the myriad interests of a unitary federal
system are best served by freeing the federal courts to develop unique
rules governing assertions of power over unconsenting defendants. Neither
sound jurisdictional policy nor due process commands otherwise.
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